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Summary
This thesis analyses farm household behaviour and livelihood strategies in the presence
of market imperfections. The first chapter uses a farm household model to explain the
presence of three household groups determined on the basis of the labour regime adop-
ted: small-scale peasants, self-cultivators and hiring-in households. A partial generalised
ordered logit model is used to test the main predictions of the model using data from the
1997 Rural Survey. The results show that access to liquidity and market imperfections
matter in the choice of the labour strategy and that liquidity constrained households are
more likely to sell labour off-farm. The second chapter provides an analysis of household
technical efficiency (TE) using using data on the KwaZulu Natal Province. The analysis is
conducted at household-level and off-farm activities are considered as additional outputs
of production. This approach better captures the jointness between farm and non-farm
activities generated by the presence of market imperfections. An important source of li-
quidity for the household is the receipt of a pension. Its effect on household TE is identified
exploiting the age eligibility criteria adopted by the pension program. The results show
that access to liquidity and income diversification has positive effects on household TE.
Finally the last chapter investigates the relationship between land and household welfare.
It uses the year of arrival in the current location as an instrument for land access and
size for households in the former homelands. This identification strategy relies on the
argument that African households have been forcibly relocated to the homelands since the
introduction of the Native Land Act in 1913. Because of increasing population pressure
in the homelands, later arrivals were less likely to have access to land and to larger plots
of land. Results show that access to land positively affects the welfare of rural household.
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1Introduction
This thesis consists of three self-contained essays devoted to the analysis of rural house-
hold livelihoods in the presence of labour and credit market imperfections. Each chapter
deals with a particular aspect of rural livelihoods, including household labour and resource
allocation and asset accumulation. The focus on South Africa is motivated by the role
that agriculture and rural development can play in addressing unemployment and poverty.
Statistical records reveal that around 43% of the total population lives in rural areas. The
high unemployment rate, around 23% at national level, is even higher in rural areas, par-
ticularly in the former homelands. Poverty, as well, is more severe as the majority of the
poor (62 % in 1996 and 57% in 2001) are found in rural areas (Leibbrandt et al., 2006).
In rural South Africa household livelihoods are characterised by a mix of land-based and
off-farm activities. This is common to most developing countries were households engage
in various activities within and outside agriculture (Dercon and Krishnan, 1996). These
activities, together with government transfers, are very important sources of income for
the rural economy and households are faced with the decision of allocating family labour
and resources across alternative tasks and activities. Understanding what influences and
constrains household decisions is important to design and target policies for rural devel-
opment. The first two chapters of this thesis analyse household resource allocation and
use in the presence of market imperfections, in particular, when households are liquidity
constrained. Labour allocation decisions are analysed in the first chapter by dividing the
2population into three categories on the basis of the labour regime adopted. In the second
chapter a measure of resource use intensity is obtained by computing an indicator of tech-
nical efficiency at household level. The last chapter focuses on the contribution of land
to rural household livelihoods. Land-based activities can contribute to the overall well-
being of the rural population by providing a return to uneducated family labour (Carter
and May, 1999) and goods and services for home consumption. According to Lipton and
Lipton (1993), small scale agriculture has the potential to address unemployment and
poverty in South Africa by providing a labour-intensive solution to the country’s large
endowment of labour.
Each chapter develops a line of argument based on the standard microeconomic the-
ory of the farm household. In this framework households’ decisions are the result of an
optimising behaviour where market imperfections can play a crucial role. In a perfect
markets scenario, household decisions are based on market prices, and production choices
are made independently of consumption preferences. In the presence of multiple market
imperfections this ”separation property” no longer holds and household labour allocation
decisions depend on both the production and the consumption side of the household. Al-
though all chapters depart from this consolidated theory of the farm household, each of
them focuses on a different aspect of households’ livelihoods and employs specific empirical
strategies particular to the empirical questions to be addressed. The empirical analyses
have been conducted using household level data. The first and third chapter use the 1997
Rural Survey, which collects information on rural households in the former homelands of
South Africa. In addition, the third chapter employs the 1996 Kwazulu-Natal Develop-
ment Indicators Household survey. Finally, the second chapter employs the third wave
(2004) of the Kwazulu-Natal Income Dynamic Survey. Each chapter, therefore, has its
own data section, theoretical framework and empirical methodology. The contributions of
this thesis are presented separately for each chapter, together with a short description of
3the methodology and the results obtained.
In the first chapter of this thesis I extend the theoretical model proposed by Sadoulet
et al. (1998) incorporating a liquidity constraint to describe the influence that a lack of pre-
harvest liquidity has on labour allocation decisions. In the farm household model, labour
market participation is explained by the relation between the on-farm marginal productiv-
ity of labour and the opportunity costs of family labour (also referred as shadow wage).
The model is consistent with the argument that a liquidity constrained household attrib-
utes a higher value to off-farm opportunities reflecting the fact that extra income helps to
ease the liquidity constraint. Households are classified into small-scale peasants (working
both on and off farm), self cultivators (autarkic in labour) and hiring-in households. The
empirical analysis tests the main predictions of the model and analyses the factors de-
termining the membership in the three household categories. Existing empirical analyses
have usually neglected the heterogeneity in which households are affected by market im-
perfections, and have therefore, assumed homogeneous shadow wages across households.
In this chapter I employ a generalised order logit and a Brant test on threshold constancy
in order to relax this assumption. This test has recently been introduced in the literature
and no applications have been found in this context. A Brant test is a statistical tool,
described in more detail in the chapter, that has also an economic interpretation. The test
allows the researcher to choose the factors (variables) that affect household-specific expos-
ure to market imperfections, i.e. household specific shadow wages. The results show that
liquidity and market imperfections matter in the choice of the labour strategy. Liquidity
constrained households are more likely to sell labour off-farm while access to information
facilitates the hiring in of workers.
The second chapter analyses farm household technical efficiency adopting a household-
level approach, which considers non-farming activities as additional outputs of production,
to understand the constraints that prevent the optimal use of household resources. Under-
4standing the reasons underlying poor performance in agriculture is, in fact, important for
improving the role that agriculture plays in contributing to the livelihood of rural house-
holds. Because rural households engage in a wide range of activities in order to generate a
livelihood, the standard analysis of technical efficiency usually conducted at farm level is
extended to capture the linkages between farming and non-farming activities. This paper
follows the work of Chavas et al. (2005) and expands his theoretical analysis by apply-
ing the concept of jointness in production, usually applied to multi-product agricultural
production, to farming and non-farming activities to show that in the presence of market
imperfections a household-level analysis of technical efficiency is more appropriate than a
farm-level analysis. The analysis focus on the impact of liquidity constraints on household
behaviour. This is done by considering the effect of the pension transfer provided by the
South African Old Age Pension Program (OAP) which is expected to cause a substantial
improvement in the households’ liquidity position. This chapter contributes to the liter-
ature by adding to the current debate on the effects of the South African OAP Program
on household behaviour and by providing an identification strategy for the liquidity effect
on household technical efficiency. The liquidity effect is identified by exploiting the age
eligibility criteria adopted by the South African OAP Program, which reaches all women
over age 60 and men over age 65. Pension eligibility is used instead of actual pension
receipt and several robustness checks are conducted in order to examine the presence of
potential confounding effects between the eligibility indicator and age trends or differences
in background. The results show that access to liquidity and income diversification have
positive effects on household technical efficiency, suggesting that institutional reforms to
improve access to labour and credit markets can allow a more efficient use of farm house-
hold resources.
The last chapter focuses on the relationship between land endowments and household
welfare in the former homelands. The homelands or bantustans were designated reserves
5were the African population was segregated during the apartheid era. Given the available
data, household welfare is measured using an asset index obtained by applying principal
component analysis. Although the economic theory of the farm household provides support
for a positive relationship between land and household welfare, little empirical evidence is
available mainly due to the difficulties in identifying the causal relationship between land
and household welfare, given the non-random allocation of land and the lack of suitable
instruments. This chapter contributes to the literature by identifying the effects of land
endowments on household welfare exploiting historical data on migration to the former
homelands. The identification strategy relies on the fact that, since the introduction of
the Native Land Act in 1913, African households have been forcibly relocated to the
homelands. Movements within the homelands can also be largely explained by govern-
ment ‘betterment planning’ for the reorganisation of the territory in the reserves. The
year of arrival in the current location is used as an instrument for land endowments since
later incomers were less likely to have access to land and to larger plots of land, given
the increasing population pressure in these areas. The year of arrival is expected to be
independent of households’ unobserved ability to generate welfare since the pace and tim-
ing of relocations are probably unrelated to unobserved household-specific characteristics.
Results show a positive and large effect of land access on household welfare. Moreover, be-
cause the homelands are relatively more disadvantaged and less fertile areas, these results
are likely to provide a lower bound for the positive effects of land on household welfare.
6Chapter 1
Market imperfections, liquidity
and farm household labour
allocation
1.1 Introduction
Household endowments and market imperfections shape the organisation of agricultural
production and lead to different production regimes within rural farm households. Us-
ing data on the rural South Africa population, landed households have been categorised
into three distinct groups on the basis of the labour regime adopted: small-scale peasants
(sellers of labour), self-cultivators (self-sufficient in labour) and hiring-in households (buy-
ers of labour). The labour regime adopted by the household is the result of an optimising
behaviour in an imperfect market scenario and is an important indicator of household
response to market imperfections. In rural South Africa household livelihoods are char-
acterised by a mix of land-based and off-farm activities. Only few households have access
to formal credit, and the decision of allocating family labour across alternative tasks and
activities is likely to be influenced not only by endowments and comparative advantages
7but also by the lack and the search for liquidity.
The categorisation of households into homogenous groups is a useful strategy to under-
stand the determinants and the consequences of particular household decisions. Dercon
and Krishnan (1996), for example, consider five household groups defined on the basis
of their income portfolio, to investigate the constraints that prevent households from en-
gaging in particular activities. Empirical analyses conducted using data on rural South
Africa also suggest the presence of quite distinct household categories. Carter and May
(1999) identify eight classes on the basis of the livelihood strategies undertaken by each
group. Such categorisation results from not only differences in tangible (land and la-
bour) and intangible assets (welfare rights, social reciprocity), but also from the ability to
effectively exploit such endowments. In Eastwood et al. (2006), the authors define categor-
ies of households on the basis of their specialisation by income source and identify three
groups within rural households in a former homeland area of the Limpopo Province (South
Africa): factor-reliant, migration-dependent and pension-dependent households. In this
chapter I also intend to exploit the categorisation of farm households into homogenous
groups to obtain useful insights on what influences household labour allocation decisions.
The membership in the three categories above mentioned is determined on the basis
of the labor regime adopted and is explained using a theoretical framework built on the
classical agricultural household model literature (Singh et al., 1986). The theoretical
model adopted in this chapter consider the presence of labour and credit market imper-
fections. In a perfect-markets scenario, household decisions are based on market prices,
and production choices are taken independently from consumption preferences, a result
commonly called ‘separation property’. In the presence of multiple market imperfections
this property no longer holds and household labour allocation decisions depend on both
the production and the consumption side of the household1. A farm household model is,
1The separation property may hold also in the absence of one market (for example the land market).
8therefore, necessary to correctly model household behaviour. Eswaran and Kotwal (1986),
following the endogenous class formation framework of Roemer (1982) who first formalised
household labour regime adoptions, use a farm household model and consider credit and
labour market imperfections to analyse membership in different modes of cultivation. In
their model the amount of credit received depends on land ownership. This framework,
however, cannot be applied to rural South Africa where land does not serve as collat-
eral and the agricultural credit sector is underdeveloped (Fenwick and Lyne, 1999). In a
similar fashion, Sadoulet et al. (1998) suggest a farm household model that incorporates
transaction costs and fixed land endowments and leads to the identification of the three
regimes above mentioned. Departing from this model I incorporate an additional liquidity
constraint to show that the lack of pre-harvest liquidity also affects the labour strategy
adopted. In the farm household model, labour market participation is explained by the
relationship between the on-farm marginal productivity of labour and the opportunity
costs of family labour for buyers and sellers. The opportunity costs are given by the
off-farm and hiring-in effective wages respectively, which incorporate transaction costs,
augmented by an endogenous mark up indicating the liquidity position of the household.
The model indicates that a liquidity constrained household attributes a higher value to
off-farm opportunities reflecting the fact that extra incomes help to ease the liquidity con-
straint (Barrett et al., 2001). An opposite effect is expect on the decision of hiring in
workers.
A partial generalised ordered logit is used to test the main predictions of the model and
to analyse the factors determining the membership in the three household categories. Only
few empirical analyses have attempted to model the heterogeneity in which households are
affected by market imperfections (Cafiero et al., 2004). In this chapter, I employ a gener-
The presence of multiple market imperfections ensures that the model is non-separable (Bardhan and
Udry, 1999).
9alised order logit and a Brant test on threshold constancy in order to allow for household
heterogeneous exposure to market imperfections. A Brant test is a statistical tool, which
function is described in the next sections, that has a useful economic interpretation. The
test allows to distinguish the variables that affect household-specific exposure to market
imperfections from those determining the on farm marginal productivity of labour. The
results of the generalised order logit model show that liquidity and market imperfections
matter in the choice of the labor strategy adopted. Liquidity is found to affect the choice
of hiring in and out labour, inducing liquidity constrained household to sell labour off-farm
and preventing the hiring in of labour.
The chapter proceeds as follows: section 2 introduces the logic behind household cat-
egory formation while section 3 reports, in more details, the theoretical model in which the
three household groups are analysed separately. Section 4 presents the empirical specific-
ation and the data used, in section 5 the results are shown and discussed; finally, section
6 concludes.
1.2 Explaining household membership in different labour
regime categories
This section introduces the rationale behind the existence of distinct household categories
based on the labour regime adopted. Households are categorised into small-scale peasants
(sellers of labour), self-cultivators (autarkic in labour) and hiring-in households (buyers
of labour)2. Labour market participation is explained by the relationship between the
on-farm marginal productivity of family labour and its opportunity cost off-farm. In the
presence of a perfectly competitive labour market, as represented in figure 1.1, household
2This analysis does not separately consider crop production and livestock rearing, the latter involving
higher entry constraints, as it is instead done in Dercon and Krishnan (1996). Moreover off-farm self-
employed activities are also excluded from the analysis given the lack of reliable data.
10
decisions are based on market wages, w, and farm technology which determines the on-
farm demand for labour.
Figure 1.1: Labour market participation with perfect labour market
The graph depicts the labour supply curve (S) and three different patterns of demand
(D) for labour. The intersection between the curves determines the on-farm marginal
productivity of labour in the case of self-sufficiency in labour (autarky). When the market
wage lies above the intersection, as in the case of a low demand for labourD1, the household
has an incentive to sell labour off-farm, and the quantity sold to the market is denoted by
f1o . The opposite occurs when the off-farm wage exceeds the autarkic on-farm marginal
productivity of labour (higher demand for labour, D3); in this case the household will find
it profitable to replace family members with the less costly hired labour, h. When on-farm
labour productivity equals the off-farm wage, the household will opt for self-sufficiency.
It is worth noting, however, that in the case of a perfect labour market, farm households
will likely either sell or hire labour.
The inclusion of labour market transaction costs determines a wage differential between
the lower wage the household can gain off-farm and the higher costs of hiring-in labour,
and is depicted by the shifts in the wage line (figure 1.2, left panel). Transaction costs,
11
such as search and transport costs (Co), reduce the off-farm effective wage, wo, while
increase the effective cost of hiring in labour, wh, due to supervision and other costs, Ch.
Because transactions costs are known to be household specific, different households are
expected to face different wage bands. Transaction costs have a negative effect on the
quantities of labour hired in and out by the household, increasing the probability of being
self-cultivators. For buyers and sellers of labour, the cost of labour equals the effective off-
farm and hiring-in wages respectively, while in the case of autarky the cost is endogenously
determined and lies within the wage band.
Figure 1.2: Household categories under market imperfections
When households face a liquidity constraint, the effects are observed in both the on-
farm marginal productivity of labour and the off-farm opportunity costs (figure 1.2, right
panel). A liquidity shortage restricts the purchasing of non-labour inputs; on-farm labour
demand falls and consequently lowers the marginal productivity of labour. At the same
time, households attribute an additional value to off-farm earnings, reflecting the fact that
extra incomes help to ease the liquidity constraint. The higher opportunity cost of working
on-farm, w˜o, is given by the effective off-farm wage and the liquidity premium. On the
12
other hand, the lack of liquidity prevents households from buying labour and is represented
by a higher cost of hired labour, w˜h. Figure 1.2 depicts two illustrative situations. The first
case refers to a lower demand household (D1): a cash shortage forces the household out
of self-sufficiency and could even lead to the abandonment of agricultural activities (D
′′
1 ).
The second example, in contrast, corresponds to a higher demand household D3 where the
binding liquidity constraint prevents the household from hiring in labour causing a switch
to self-sufficiency. In both cases the household shifts down the hierarchy; the overall effect
of a cash shortage is, therefore, an increase in the likelihood of being small-scale peasants,
for lower demand households, and a decrease in the likelihood of being in the hiring-in
category for the higher demand households.
The above discussion has shown how household characteristics influence the demand
and supply of family labour and its opportunity cost. The location of the demand and
supply curve is determined by household technology and endowments. Transaction costs,
which depend both on household-specific characteristics and other factors exogenous to
the household, determine the effective market wages. Changes in household endowments,
given their effect on the liquidity position of the household, can cause the wage band to
shift and affect, at the same time, the marginal productivity of labour. Depending on the
initial conditions, changes in household characteristics can cause a switch from small-scale
peasants to self-cultivators or from self-cultivators to the hiring-in category, and vice versa,
through their effects on the marginal productivity of labour and on the thresholds: w˜o
and w˜h. These two effects, however, cannot be separated a priori; this issue is addressed
during the empirical estimation with the support of a Brant test on threshold constancy.
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1.3 A farm household model to explain labour market par-
ticipation
The model presented in this section provides the theoretical foundations for the emergence
of the above-mentioned household categories in a imperfect markets scenario. In particular
it considers imperfections in the labour market, allowing for the presence of transaction
costs which are directly translated into the effective cost of labour, and a pre-harvest
liquidity constraint. The model departs from that presented in Sadoulet et al. (1998)
and is extended via the inclusion of non-labour inputs, as an additional component of
the farm production function, and a pre-harvest cash constraint. The effective cost of
hiring (unskilled) labour (h) is given by the market wage plus search and supervision costs
and is defined as wh. The effective off-farm wage includes search and other transaction
costs and differs between unskilled (w1o) and skilled labour (w
2
o). The imperfections in
the labour market are therefore translated into the following relation w1o < wh < w
2
o .
Family labour is also allocated to on-farm activities (skilled and unskilled: f1q , f
2
q ) and to
leisure (f1l , f
2
l ). Unskilled family labour is assumed to be homogenous implying that all
members possess the same on-farm productivity. I also employ the standard assumptions
of increasing, strictly concave and continuously differentiable utility u() and production
q() functions to ensure an unique solution to the model. Production inputs, x, A and L
(where L = f1q + f
2
q + h) are assumed to be complementary as well as income and leisure,
u1y, u2y > 0. As reported by several authors3, in rural South Africa income from non-
agricultural sources, such as wage employment, is important in providing working capital
for the purchase of seeds, fertilisers, and other production inputs; to take this into account
I include a liquidity constraint on pre-harvest transactions where α is the fraction of hiring
3The complete list of study suggesting such conclusions is reported in Van Zyl et al. (1995).
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costs and household earnings that occurres before the harvesting (α > 0):
pxx+ αwhh+K ≤ α(w1of1o + w2of2o ) + S,
where x represents non-labour production inputs which price is px, K are fixed setup costs
and S is the pre-harvest amount of exogenous transfers. The household maximises utility,
which is a function of leisure and income, y. The maximisation is subject to the above
liquidity constraint together with additional non-negativity constraints on labour demand
and supply, and on the amount of inputs and leisure time:
max
f1o ,f
2
o ,f
1
q ,f
2
q ,h,x
U(f1l , f
2
l , y),
where y = pq(A, h+f1q +f
2
q , x)−whh−wxx−K+w1of1o+w2of2o+T and f1l = f1−f1q−f1o , f2l =
f2 − f2l − f2o . The lagrangean function for this problem and the respective first order
conditions are reported below.
L = U(f1l , f
2
l , pq(A, h+ f
1
q + f
2
q , x)− whh− wxx−K + w1of1o + w2of2o + T )
+λ(α(w1of
1
o + w
2
of
2
o ) + S − pxx− α(whh)−K) + µnkfnk + µhh+ µxx,
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with k = q, o, l and n = 1, 2.
1a) h : uy(pqL − wh) + µh − λαwh = 0, h ≥ 0, µhh = 0,
2a) f1q : uypqL − u1 + µ1q − µ1l = 0, f1q ≥ 0, µ1i f1q = 0,
3a) f2q : uypqL − u2 + µ2q − µ2l = 0, f2q ≥ 0, µ2qf2i = 0,
4a) f1o : uyw
1
o − u1 + µ1o − µ1l + λαw1o = 0, f1o ≥ 0, µ1of1o = 0,
5a) f2o : uyw
2
o − u2 + µ2o − µ2l + λαw2o = 0, f2o ≥ 0, µ2of2o = 0,
6a) x : uy(pqx − px) + µx − λαpx = 0, x ≥ 0, µxx = 0,
7a) λ : α(w1of
1
o + w
2
of
2
o ) + S − pxx− αwhh−K ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0,
λ(α(w1of
1
o + w
2
of
2
o ) + S − pxx− αwhh−K) = 0,
8a) µnk : f
n
k ≥ 0, µnk ≥ 0, µnkfnk = 0, n = 1, 2,
where λ is the marginal value of liquidity, T are exogenous transfers mainly represented
by pensions and remittances and A is the fixed amount of assets owned by the household,
which includes land. I use the notation qL to indicate the marginal productivity of labour
while u1 and u2 refers to the marginal utility of leisure time for unskilled and skilled
members respectively. Since land in South Africa is mainly allocated by local or tribal
authorities which provides only use rights, land is assumed to be fixed and cannot serve
as collateral for credit (Fenwick and Lyne, 1999).
The inclusion of a liquidity constraint does not affect farm labour allocation of skilled
household members. As in Sadoulet et al. (1998), skilled members do not work on-farm.
This can be directly derived from the initial assumption wh < w2o , which implies that
there are no incentives for the household to employ skilled members on-farm since the
foregone wage is higher than the cost of hiring labour4. The model does not explain the
4In the model, the initial assumption wh < w
2
o implies a positive complementary slack variable asso-
ciated with on-farm skilled labour f2q which expression can be obtained substituting equations 1a and 5a
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presence of households that are both hiring in and out unskilled labour. Given the initial
assumption, w1o < wh, the cost of hiring-in labour exceeds the wage unskilled members
can gain off-farm. The household, therefore, has an incentive to replace hired workers
with family labour5. Moreover, given the small percentage (about 4%) of households both
selling and buying labour in our sample, this category will not be considered in this study.
Following the same assumptions of Sadoulet et al. (1998) I focus on unskilled family
labour only, assuming that skilled members work a fixed number of hours off-farm, f2o =
kf2. The model can be simplified and reduced to the following:
max
h,x,f1o ,f
1
q ,
U(f1l , f
2(1− k), y),
s.t pxx+ αwhh+K ≤ α(w1of1o + w2okf2) + S,
where y = pq(A, h+ f1q , x)−whh− pxx−K +w1of1o +w2okf2 + T and f1l = f1 − f1q − f1o .
The first order conditions for this problem are reported below:
1b) h : uy(pqL − wh) + µh − λαwh = 0, h ≥ 0, µhh = 0,
2b) f1q : uypqL − u1 + µ1q − µ1l = 0, f1i ≥ 0, µ1qf1i = 0,
3b) f1o : uyw
1
o − u1 + µ1o − µ1l + λαw1o = 0, f1o ≥ 0, µ1of1o = 0,
4b) x : uy(pqx − px) + µx − λαpx = 0, x ≥ 0, µxx = 0,
5b) λ : α(w1of
1
o + w
2
of
2
o ) + S − α(pxx− whh)−K ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0,
λ(α(w1of
1
o + w
2
of
2
o ) + S − α(pxx− whh)−K) = 0,
6b) µ1k : f
1
k ≥ 0, µ1k ≥ 0, µ1kf1k = 0.
into 3a to obtain µ2q = uy(w
2
o − wh) + λ(w2o − wh) + µ2o + µh > 0. If µ2q > 0, by complementary slackness,
f2q = 0.
5The same intuition can be derived substituting equations 1a and 2a into 4a and considering households
with positive hired labour (µh = 0) to obtain µ
1
o = uy(wh − w1o) + µ1q + λ(wh − w1o) ≥ 0. A positive com-
plementary slack variable implies zero off-farm unskilled labour. At the same time, considering households
whose members work off-farm, no hired labour is admitted.
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Below the three household groups and the landed workers category are analysed separately.
Landed workers. A lower bound on working capital (including land, human capital
and agricultural capital) is specified here so that households below this threshold will
consider cultivation unprofitable. As reported in Eswaran and Kotwal (1986), a household
will engage in farming activities only if its optimal utility in agriculture, U∗a , exceeds the
utility of being a pure worker, U∗w. A0 represents a set of assets such that, when A > A0 :
U∗a (f
1, f2, wo, wh, px, T,K,A, ) > U∗w(f
1, f2, T, wo),
where:
U∗w(f
1, f2, T, wo) = max
f1o
U(f1l , f
2(1− k), w1of1o + wo2kf2 + T ).
The presence of fixed set-up costs, K, and the lack of liquidity to cover labour and non-
labour inputs costs can prevent households from engaging in agricultural activities. These
conditions determine the emergence of a category of landed workers. For households with
A > A0, below I analyse the characteristics of each category separately.
Self-cultivators. This category includes households self-sufficient in labour: house-
holds that do not sell or hire unskilled labour. The model reduces to the following four
equations:
1c) pqL = u1/uy = w∗,
2c) pqx = px(1 + λα/uy) = p˜x,
3c) αw2of
2
o + S − pxx−K ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0,
λ(αw2of
2
o + S − αpxx−K) = 0,
4c) y = pq(A, f1q , x)− pxx+ w2okf2 + T −K.
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The marginal productivity of labour in the autarkic case, from now w∗, is a function
of household characteristics and technology and will be used as a benchmark for the
identification of the other categories. When the liquidity constraint is binding, the price
of inputs (p˜x) is given by the market price and an endogenous markup (λ/uy) representing
the marginal utility of liquidity. The above system of equations defines w∗ as a function
of all the exogenous variable:
w∗ = w∗(A, f1, f2, T,K,w2o , p˜x, α) = w
∗(A, f1, f2, T, w2o ,K, px, S, α). (1.1)
Since wh > wo, the marginal productivity of labour lies between the two thresholds,
w1o < w
∗ < wh, implying zero incentives to buy and sell labour.
Small-scale peasants. Households belonging to this category allocate labour both
on- and off-farm while no hired labour is required. Considering equations 2b and 3b,
appropriately adapted to this specific case (µ1q = 0 and µ
1
o = 0), I obtain the following
expression:
pqL =
u1 + µ1l
uy
= w1o
(
1 +
λα
uy
)
= w˜1o . (1.2)
The on-farm marginal productivity of labour equals the off-farm shadow wage (w˜1o), which
is given by the effective price of labour augmented by an endogenous markup caused by the
presence of a liquidity constraint (liquidity premium). Because the marginal productivity
of labour is a decreasing function of labour, the marginal productivity of labour for small-
scale peasants (pqL) is expected to be higher than in the case of autarky (w∗). The
condition determining the membership in this category is, therefore, the following:
w∗ < w˜1o .
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The household will sell labour if the opportunity cost given by the effective off-farm wage
and the liquidity premium is greater than the on-farm remuneration they would get if all
family members worked on the household’s farm (w∗). The presence of a binding liquidity
constraint increases the opportunity cost of being a self-cultivator, thereby shifting the
threshold delimiting this category (figure 1.2, right panel) and inducing the family to sell
labour.
Hiring-in households. Households belonging to this category hire in labour in ad-
dition to their own family members. Members do not work off-farm and, considering
equations 1b and 2b with the opportune adjustments (µh = 0 and µ1q = 0), it follows that:
pqL =
u1 + µ1l
uy
= wh
(
1 +
λα
uy
)
= w˜h. (1.3)
Because the marginal productivity of labour is a decreasing function of labour, then w∗ >
w˜h. When the household buys labour, family members can be substituted by hired workers;
the opportunity cost of family labour, w˜h, is given by the effective wage plus a liquidity
markup. If w∗ is greater than the hiring-in shadow wage (w˜h), the household will have
an incentive to hire in labour. The presence of a binding liquidity constraint raises the
opportunity cost and discourages the hiring of workers; the upper threshold in figure 1.2
(right panel) shifts upward.
Table 1.1: Results of the comparative statics exercise
Effect Sign Effect Sign
∂w∗
∂f1
− ∂w∗
∂f2
±
∂w∗
∂T
+ ∂w
∗
∂px
−
∂w∗
∂A
+
The household behaviour illustrated in figure 1.2 can be also depicted through a com-
parative statics exercise which, in addition, identifies the sign of the effects and offers
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a set of conditions that can be empirically tested. Table 1.1 summarises the expected
signs derived using the procedure reported in the Appendix 1. Larger endowments of land
and higher income transfers raises the marginal productivity of labour thereby lowering
the probability of selling labour and increasing the probability of hiring in agricultural
workers, ceteris paribus. Larger endowments of unskilled family labour lower the marginal
productivity of labour causing a switch from the hiring-in category to the self-cultivators
and to the small-scale peasant categories (depending on the initial conditions). Finally,
the effect of skilled labour is ambiguous6. The predictions reported in table 1.1 will be
tested using a partial generalised ordered logit as described in the following section.
1.4 Data and empirical specification
Membership of one of the three household categories is determined by the endogenous
marginal productivity of labour, w∗, function of the household characteristics and techno-
logy, and the shadow wage bands, which are influenced by household specific transaction
costs and liquidity position. The three household groups can be ordered in accordance
with the latent marginal productivity of labour. The probability of belonging to one of
the three categories can be estimated considering the model reported below:
P (dj = 1) = P (i ∈ small-scale peasants) = P (w∗i + vi < w1oi(Coi, λi),
P (dj = 2) = P (i ∈ self-sufficients) = P (w1oi(Coi, λi) < w∗i + vi < whi(Chi, λi),
P (dj = 3) = P (i ∈ hiring-in households) = P (w∗i + vi > whi(Chi, λi),
where i indicates the i-th household and j are the categories. Chi and Coi represent the
determinants of transaction costs associated with hiring labour in and out, λi indicates the
6For a discussion of this ambiguity see the Appendix 1.
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household-specific liquidity status and vi is the error term. Considering the first condition,
for example, the probability of belonging to the first category (small-scale peasants) cor-
responds to the probability that the endogenous marginal productivity of labour (w∗) is
lower that the off-farm shadow wage. The model will be tested using a partial generalised
ordered logit which allows for household specific thresholds. This procedure relaxes the
assumption underlying the classical ordered logit model in which the relationship between
the explanatory variables and the response does not vary across categories (parallel equa-
tions assumption). The standard ordered logit model estimates common thresholds, which
corresponds to estimate similar effective shadow wages across categories (as it is done in
Sadoulet et al. (1998)). It is widely recognised in the literature (de Janvry et al., 1991)
that households are not affected by market imperfections with the same intensity; en-
dowments and environmental, social and cultural factors affect their specific exposure to
market imperfections. Households with different characteristics are therefore expected to
face different transaction costs, i.e. different effective market wages. Moreover, thresholds
are also affected by the household-specific liquidity position. In this chapter I use a partial
generalised ordered logit, which allows for household specific thresholds and helps relaxing
the assumption of constant shadow wages across households.
The marginal productivity of labour in autarky, w∗, namely the latent variable of the
model, is assumed to be a linear function7 of the shadow price of inputs p˜i and of those
household characteristics, Xwi that have been identified as determinants of the latent
variable by the Brant test:
w∗i = X
w
i βw + p˜iθ + εwi, (1.4)
where βw is a vector of coefficients and the error εw has a standard logistic distribution.
7The same linear approximation has been used also in Bedi and Tunali (2005).
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The procedure undelying the Brant test is described in more detail below. The shadow
price of inputs, such as seeds, fertilisers and chemicals can be also linearly approximated
by:
p˜i = X
p
i βp + εpi, (1.5)
where the explanatory variables, Xpi , are representative of both the demand (for example
household technology and endowments) and the supply (for example market prices) of
inputs. Given the relationship reported in equation 1.1, equation 1.5 can be substituted
into 1.4 to obtain the reduced form expression for the shadow wage:
w∗i = X
w
i βw + (X
p
i βp + εpi)θ + εwi.
Collecting terms and setting the intercept to zero, the expression reduces to the following:
w∗ = Xβ + v.
The two thresholds are assumed to be a linear function of the household specific determ-
inants of transaction costs and liquidity status:
wn = δ0 + Zδn + ϕn,
where n = o, h, which indicates the off-farm and hiring-in wage respectively.
When a variable affects both the thresholds and the latent marginal productivity of
labour, as in the case of liquidity related variables, the two effects cannot generally be
separated. This identification problem can be solved including the variable either in the
X or in the Z set of regressors; this does not imply any loss of generality since it does not
23
matter whether the liquidity effect is interpreted as a labour demand or a shadow wage
effect on the probability of hiring labour in or out. Departing from a standard ordered
logit, a threshold constancy test (Brant test8) is used to determine which variables have to
be considered as determinants of thresholds. In the case of a statistically significant test
statistic, the constancy assumption has to be rejected, and the variables must be included
in the threshold equations. Once the variables have been allocated either to the threshold
or to the latent regression, a partial generalised ordered logit is estimated to characterise
membership in the three household categories. The log likelihood function I estimate is
therefore the following:
li(β, δ) = 1[dj = 1] log[Λ(wo −Xβ − Zδo)] + 1[dj = 2] log[Λ(wh −Xβ − Zδh)
−Λ(wo −Xβ − Zδo)] + 1[dj = 3] log[1− Λ(wh −Xβ − Zδh)]. (1.6)
where β is the vector of coefficients satisfying the parallel regression assumption and δn
are the vector of coefficient that vary across household categories9.
1.4.1 The partial generalised ordered logit and the Brant test
In this section the procedure employed to test the main predictions of the theoretical
model is presented in details. It is useful to start from a standard order logit specification
which assumes constant thresholds and can be summarised as follows:
P (dj = 1) = P (w∗i < wo),
P (dj = 2) = P (wo < w∗i < wh),
P (dj = 3) = P (w∗i > wh).
8An alternative method to test threshold constancy is presented in Pudney and Shield (2000).
9The model has been estimated using the stata command gologit2 (Williams, 2006).
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where w∗i = Mβ + v is the latent regression and M is a set of households characteristics
and other factors exogenous to the household. According to the theoretical model the
thresholds correspond to the shadow wages, where w˜o and w˜h are the hiring out and in
wages, respectively. In this case they are considered constant across households. The
loglikelihood function is the following:
li(β) = 1[dj = 1] log[Λ(wo −Mβ)] + 1[dj = 2] log[Λ(wh −Mβ)−
Λ(wo −Mβ)] + 1[dj = 3] log[1− Λ(wh −Mβ)].
In this model a unique vector of β coefficients is estimated and, considering for simplicity
only one independent variable, m, the cumulative probability outcomes are:
P (d ≤ 1|m) = F (wo − βm),
P (d ≤ 2|m) = F (wh − βm),
which are represented in figure 1.310. The two curves are parallel as a consequence of equal
coefficients across categories implied by the parallel regression assumption (or proportional
odds assumption in the case of ordered logit) underlining standard ordinal models.
It is now possible to introduce a new feature in the model. Transactions costs and
liquidity position are household specific factors. Therefore, the thresholds are expected to
differ across households and across categories. This can be implemented using a generalised
ordered logit which allows for heterogenous thresholds. Assuming, for the moment, that
the above mentioned set of characteristics, M, also affect the thresholds:
wn = δ0 + Mδn + ϕn,
10This graph has been taken from Long and Freese (2003) with opportune modifications.
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Figure 1.3: Parallel regression assumption
where n = o, h, then the log likelihood functions of the generalised ordered logit model is:
li(β, δ) = 1[dj = 1] log[Λ(wo −M(β − δo))] + 1[dj = 2] log[Λ(wh −M(β − δh))
−Λ(wo −M(β − δo))] + 1[dj = 3] log[1− Λ(wh −M(β − δh))].
The estimation gives two distinct vectors of coefficients which differ across categories. It
is worth noting that the coefficients β, δo, and δh cannot be identified since only the
differences β − δo and β − δh are estimated. Although coefficients are allowed to vary
across categories some (or all) of them may not be statistically different across categories.
This suggests the possibility of testing the parallel regression assumption through the
pairwise comparison of the compound coefficients. A Brant test, which performs a Wald
test on coefficient constancy for each variable, tests the null hypothesis that there is no
difference between each pair of coefficients (Ho : δo = δh = 0). Variables presenting
a statistically significant test statistic violate the parallel regression assumption and are
used as regressors in the threshold equations. Defining Z as the subset of variables failing
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the test and X as its complement, the model reduces to:
P (dj = 1) = P (Xβ + v < wo),
P (dj = 2) = P (wo < Xβ + v < wh),
P (dj = 3) = P (Xβ + v > wh),
where wn = δ0 + Zδn + ϕn for n = o, h. The log likelihood function for the partial
generalised logit model is the following:
li(β, δ) = 1[dj = 1] log[Λ(wo −Xβ + Zδo)] + 1[dj = 2] log[Λ(wh −Xβ + Zδh)
−Λ(wo −Xβ + Zδo)] + 1[dj = 3] log[1− Λ(wh −Xβ + Zδh)],
and corresponds to equation 1.6, which is estimated in this chapter. The results are
reported in table 1.5.
1.4.2 Data
This chapter uses the Rural Survey for South Africa conducted by Statistics South Africa
in 1997. The survey collected information on 6000 rural households located in the former
homeland areas. Within the ‘old’ South Africa, 10 homelands (Bantustans) were cre-
ated, four of which were granted ‘independence’ by South Africa (not recognised by any
other country in the world): Transkei (*1976), Bophuthatswana(*1977), Venda (*1979),
Ciskei(*1981), KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Gazankulu, Qwaqwa and Lebowa11.
About 13 million people (31% to total population) lives in rural areas in the former home-
lands. The unemployment rate in South Africa, 23% at national level, is higher in rural
areas than in the urban centres. In particular, with the adoption of apartheid policies,
11The asterisk precedes the year of independency declaration.
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millions of Africans were segregated in the former homelands areas which are, in general,
characterised by poor land quality and little job opportunities (BEPA, 2004). About 70%
of households has access to land for farming purposes and farms are in general small with
an average land size of about 1.4 hectares with one third of them cultivating a field which
is smaller than 1 hectare.
This chapter identifies three groups of households on the basis of the allocation of
unskilled family labour12 and on the presence of hired labour. Households with members
working both on- and off-farm are defined small-scale peasants while self-cultivators de-
vote all family labour to their own farming activities, constituting the largest category in
the sample (54%). Hiring-in households, besides family labour, employ additional hired
workers and correspond to 13% of the sample. Households engaged in both hiring labor
in and out have been excluded and constitute 3% of the entire sample. The sample has
additionally been restricted to those households only involved in maize production (75%),
so that a total of 2038 have been used in the estimation. Category characteristics are
summarised in table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics by category
Variables Small-scale peasants Self-cultivators Hiring-in hhs
(33.65 %) (53.75 %) (12.6 %)
Land hectares (mean) 1.77 2.14 2.60
Unskilled members (male - mean) 2.76 2.11 2.08
Unskilled members (female - mean) 3.00 2.59 2.47
Skilled members (mean) 1.16 1.21 1.25
Hhs with access to pensions (%) 15.72 29.19 27.11
Age of the household head (mean) 51.93 55.62 56.14
Agricultural assets are represented by the hectares of land for growing crops13 and
by household human capital (proxied by the age of the household head14). Hiring-in
12Skilled labour includes those household members with a level of education higher than the compulsory
general education and training which runs from grade 0 to grade 9 (Department of Education, Republic of
South Africa). In the South Africa education system there are other two educational bands: further educa-
tion and training (from grade 10 to 12) and the higher education and training which includes undergraduate
and postgraduate degrees, certificates and diplomas
13Grazing land is mainly communal and no information is available on the disposal size.
14If the head of the household belongs to the skilled labour forces employed off-farm than the oldest
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households cultivate, on average, larger areas and have fewer unskilled members in the
household (table 1.2). Exogenous transfers are represented by pensions measured by the
number of pension eligible members in the household. In the 1997 the South Africa pension
system provided a maximum benefit of 370 rand a month (around half of average household
income) to all women over age 60 and men over age 65, which can however be reduced
on the basis of individual incomes including income from assets (Case and Deaton, 1998).
The use of this variable is further discussed in the next section. Additional variables
are included and concern access to information: a dummy variable indicating whether or
not the household obtains information on-farming through newspapers, media and other
methods and an index of labour market development constructed as the average number
of employed and unemployed members in the household by district. Finally I also include
a measure of the intensity of the extension officer activities, computed as the average
number of household visited by the officers in the district.
1.4.3 Identification
To test the validity of the comparative statics exercise conducted in the theoretical part
of this chapter, it is first important to take into account the possible consequences of an
endogenous household structure that is here represented by the number of skilled and un-
skilled household members. According to table 1.1, a higher number of unskilled members
is expected to have a negative effect on the endogenous marginal productivity of labour.
There are, however, two possible sources of endogeneity: the potential reverse causation
between marginal productivity and household structure and the joint correlation with
omitted unobservables. In the first case a lower on-farm labour productivity may induce
households to reduce their size mainly through migrations or child fostering. This could
lead to simultaneity bias problem which would potentially bias our coefficient toward zero.
member working on-farm is considered.
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In the second case household structure could be correlated, for example, with unobserved
household attitude and ability which also affects labour productivity. Unfortunately there
is no valid instrument that could address this potential endogeneity problem. Moreover the
generalised ordered logit approach adopted here cannot directly handle the endogeneity
problem even in the presence of suitable instruments.
The exogeneity of income transfers is now discussed in order to address the potential
identification problem concerning the liquidity effect. In our model income transfers are
represented by pensions. Particular features of the Old Age Pension Program (OAP) in
South Africa make it suitable for this analysis. The program reaches all women over age
60 and all men over age 65. The amount transferred does not take into account labour
history; the means test is based on individual income only (other household members
are not taken into account) and, in practise, only affects the white population (Duflo
(2003), Edmonds (2006)). This provides no incentives for other household members to
stop working and excludes the possibility of any adjustments in household composition in
order to obtain the pension. Because pension take-up could be potentially endogenous,
in this chapter I use the number of age-eligible members rather than the actual number
of pensioners in the household. Pension eligibility is exogenous to household unobserved
ability and it also provides a better proxy for the presence of pensioners in the household
than that available using the survey. The survey, in fact, only asks about the pension to
those members that are not currently working. It is not possible, therefore, to compute
the take-up rate. Nevertheless Case and Deaton (1998), using a nationally representative
survey conducted in 1993, two years after the expansion of the program, show that about
80% of African women and about 77% of African men age-qualified for the pension actually
receive the transfer.
An additional concern on identification regards the possible endogeneity of the distri-
bution of land. Land in South Africa is mainly allocated by the local or central authority
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(85% of the sample). Households in general possess only use rights and cannot sell or
rent the land (only 2% of interviewed households declare to have purchased or rented the
land); this excludes the possibility of land size adjustment through access to the market.
A further source of concern, however, regards the fact that land endowments could still be
correlated with household unobservable characteristics, for example in the case that more
influential households use their bargaining power to obtain larger land plots. The data
do not offer the possibility to test this hypothesis and this potential endogeneity prob-
lem cannot be fully addressed. Moreover, even in the presence of suitable instruments
(presented in chapter 3) the generalised ordered logit approach adopted here cannot easily
handle instrumental variable estimations, as mentioned above. Finally, variations in the
unobserved land quality could also lead to bias results. This problem, however, is partly
ruled out since land in the former homelands, where the survey has been conducted, was
generally of poor quality (BEPA, 2004). Moreover, by controlling for province and area
fixed effects this problem is further reduced.
1.5 Results
The negative relationship between land size and productivity reported in table 1.3 support,
at prima facie, the presence of imperfections in the factor markets. In the presence of
perfect markets, equal output to land ratio is expected across households since all farmers
should adjust demand and supply to market conditions. On the other hand, table 1.3
reveals significant variations in productivity across groups.
The results of the threshold constancy test, reported in table 1.4, determine the al-
location of each variable either to the threshold or to the response regressions. Variables
presenting a high Chi-square statistic do not satisfy the parallel regression assumption:
their coefficients differ significantly across categories and have been classified as regressors
in the threshold equations.
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Table 1.3: Maize produced per hectare by class of land size
# Land size Obs mean Differences
in hectares (tons/hectare)
1 Less than 0.15 228 21.200
(5.031)
2 Between 0.15 and 0.25 255 0.756 2-1 20.445
(0.048) (4.756)
3 Between 0.25 and 0.5 385 0.449 3-2 0.306
(0.023) (0.048)
4 Between 0.5 and 1 512 0.355 4-3 0.094
(0.036) (0.046)
5 Between 1 and 3.5 349 0.243 5-4 0.112
(0.041) (0.056)
6 More than 3.5 145 0.145 6-5 0.099
(0.018) (0.064)
Standard errors are in parenthesis. The last column report the differences in
mean between each land size category and the previous.
Land has been categorised as determinant of the marginal productivity of labour.
Because rural households possess only use rights, land in general cannot be sold, rented or
used as collateral and is, therefore, expected to positively affect the endogenous marginal
productivity of labour. The fact that land is not considered as a covariate in the threshold
regressions reasonably suggests that it does not influence household specific liquidity status
and transaction costs. The number of skilled members also affects w∗. In the theoretical
model presented in section 1.3, skilled workers are assumed to work a fixed fraction of
total time endowment off-farm. In our sample, however, given the underdevelopment
of the rural labour market, a considerable fraction of skilled members are found to be
unemployed (41%). The presence of skilled members, therefore, is less probable to have
an income/liquidity effect for the household; on the other hand, a positive knowledge
spillover effect on other unskilled members combined with an opposite negative consumer-
worker ratio effect (see Appendix 1) are likely to affect the marginal productivity on-farm,
as it is suggested by the test results. Unskilled members (male and female) are also
included as regressors in the latent regression (w∗) in line with the theoretical predictions.
The Brant test suggests that the number of pension eligible members should be included
as regressors in the threshold equations. While this finding does not alter the overall
interpretation of their impact on category determination it confirms the presence of a
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Table 1.4: Brant test on Parallel Regression Assumption
Variable chi2 p>chi2
Determinants of the latent variable: w∗ p>0.05
Land (ha) 3.57 0.059
Unskilled labor - male 0.36 0.549
Unskilled labor - female 0.66 0.417
Skilled labor 0.08 0.781
Age of household head 0.85 0.358
Length of residency 3.00 0.083
Determinants of the thresholds: fwn, n = o, h p<0.05
Gender of household head (male) 16.36 0.000
Education of household head 4.99 0.026
Access to information (dummy) 10.14 0.001
Contact with extension officer (by district) 12.39 0.000
Labor market dev index (by district) 7.62 0.006
Number of pension eligible members 8.81 0.003
binding liquidity constraint which affects household participation in the labour market.
Considering, for example, equation 1.2, the threshold delimiting the small-scale peasants
category, w˜1o , incorporates a liquidity premium. This implies that, when households face
a cash shortage (λ > 0), off-farm earnings are valued more than their effective price (wo).
This is supported by the above results where pensions, which are expected to relax the
liquidity constraint (having an impact on λ), have been found to affect the thresholds. This
result suggests that households in rural South Africa face a binding liquidity constraint
which affects their labour allocation choices. The intensity of extension officer services
and the level of development of the local labour market have been found to affect the
thresholds probably through their influence on transaction costs. The magnitude and
the sign of such effects are discussed through the interpretation of the partial generalised
ordered logit results which are reported in table 1.5.
In the first column (table 1.5), where the determinants of the marginal productivity
of labour are reported, variables with a positive coefficient are expected to have a positive
effect on w∗ increasing the probability of belonging to a higher category where the lowest
one is represented by the small-scale peasants category by self-cultivators households and
by hiring-in households. Results confirm the predictions of the comparative static exercise.
Larger land size increases the marginal productivity of labour and lowers the probability
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of working off-farm while increasing the probability of hiring in labour. The number of
unskilled male and female members negatively affects the marginal productivity of labour
implying that larger families tend to sell labour off-farm and are less likely to hire in
workers.
Table 1.5: Results of the partial generalised ordered logit
Variable w∗ Small peasants Self-cultivatorsewo ewh
Land (ha) 0.040∗∗
(0.013)
Unskilled labor - female -0.152∗∗∗
(0.031)
Unskilled labor - male -0.181∗∗∗
(0.029)
Skilled labor 0.037
(0.037)
Age of household head -0.0014
(0.004)
Gender of household head (male) -0.937∗∗∗ -0.314∗∗
(0.111) (0.137)
Education of household head 0.062∗∗∗ 0.024
(0.015) (0.017)
Pensions 0.874∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.110)
Access to information -0.034 0.608∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.188)
Contacts with extension officers (by district) 2.66∗∗∗ 5.991∗∗∗
(0.753) (0.691)
Labor markt dev index (by district) -0.768∗∗∗ -0.286
(0.174) (0.170)
Sample size: 2037
Goodness of fit
Mckelvey and Zavoina R2: 0.24
Loglikelihood Full Model: -1727.935
Outcomes correctly predicted: 60.28%
Province and area dummies omitted. Numbers reported in parentheses are the standard errors;
*, ** and *** indicates a significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
To interpret the last two columns of coefficients, results can be related to those from
two binary logit models in which the first category (small-scale peasants) is related to
the other two and, in the last column, the first two classes are compared to the highest
(hiring-in households). Coefficients can be interpreted as representing the effect of the
selected variables on the probability of being in a higher class through their influence
on the threshold delimiting the category and reported in the table header. Exogenous
transfers (pensions) lower the liquidity premium and decrease w˜o (equation 1.2). As
expected, households receiving pensions are less likely to sell labour off-farm; coefficients
indicate a positive effect on the probability to move from small-scale peasants to a higher
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category. Exogenous transfers have also a positive effect on the probability of hiring in
labour thorough their effect on the hiring-in shadow wage (w˜h). The impact is, however,
smaller than that on the small-scale peasant category. The degree of development of
the local labour market is positively related to the effective off-farm wage since a better
developed market implies lower transaction costs and favours the participation of the
household in the labour market; however no effect is found for the hiring-in category.
Being in a district where extension officers’ visits are more frequent has a positive impact
on transaction costs and increase the probability of being in a higher category, the effect
is larger on the probability of hire in labour. Finally, results suggest that a male headed
household is more likely to send members to work off-farm and less likely to hire in
labour; because in rural South Africa male heads usually tend to migrate to urban centres
(Makhura, 2001), their presence in the household seems to signal a liquidity shortage which
affects the labour strategy adopted by the household.
1.6 Conclusions
This chapter has explored how, in the presence of labour market imperfections, asset
endowments and liquidity constraints affect the choice of the labour regime adopted by
the household. Households are categorised on the basis of their labour strategy (small-scale
peasants, self-cultivators and hiring-in households) and a standard farm household model
is used to explain the membership in the three groups. Labour market imperfections
are translated into wage differentials where transactions costs determine the difference
between the hiring-in and out wages. The presence of a binding liquidity constraint raises
the opportunity cost of family labour, making off-farm opportunities more attractive and
the hiring-in of labour harder. A partial generalised ordered logit is used to test the
main predictions of the model and a Brant test on threshold constancy is employed to
empirically identify the variables affecting the opportunity costs of family labour. The use
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of a more flexible estimation approach, in contrast with the ordered logit model proposed
in Sadoulet et al. (1998), allows the modelling of household heterogeneous exposure to
market imperfections. Results support the theoretical prepositions. A lack of liquidity
induces household members to work off-farm. This confirms what has been previously
found in the literature (Van Zyl et al. (1995) and Fenwick and Lyne (1999)). The results
suggest the need for policy reforms in the rural credit sector which, according to the
results, could be initially addressed to small-scale peasants since liquidity shortages seem
to have a larger impact on their labour allocation decisions. On the other hand, when
non-farm activities constitute the solution to cope with cash shortage, policies aimed to
the development of the local labour market can reduce transactions costs and improve the
participation to the labour market. This can help farmers to gain alternative sources of
income and escape poverty.
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Chapter 2
Liquidity constraints and farm
household technical efficiency.
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an analysis of household technical efficiency using a sample of farm
households in the KwaZulu Natal Province. About 60% of KwaZulu Natal households are
estimated to be involved in agricultural activities. Although a large fraction of rural house-
holds has access to land for agricultural purposes, farming activities remain a marginal
source of income. Understanding the reasons underlying poor performance in agricul-
ture is an important task to provide insights for the ongoing land reform programs, and
to improve the role of agriculture in contributing to the livelihood of rural households.
Analysing farm household technical efficiency can help in understanding farm households’
behaviour and the constraints that prevent them from optimally employing their resources.
A previous study done by Piesse et al. (1996) provides the first analysis of South African
farms’ technical efficiency, which is however confined to a limited sample of households in
the three homelands of KaNgwane, Lebowa and Venda. This chapter provides an analysis
of technical efficiency with a particular focus on the role of access to liquidity and income
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diversification. It is, in fact, recognised in the literature that rural households engage in a
wide range of activities in order to generate a livelihood. The standard analysis of tech-
nical efficiency is here extended to capture the linkages between farming and non-farming
activities that characterise the livelihoods of most rural households.
In the empirical specification, the liquidity effect is identified by exploiting the age
eligibility criteria adopted by the South Africa Old Age Pension Program (OAP). Pension
eligibility is used instead of actual pension receipt and several checks are conducted in
order to examine the presence of potential confounding effects between the eligibility
indicator and age trends or differences in background. Instrumental variable technique is
also used to address the potential endogeneity of the income diversification index. The
results show that access to liquidity and income diversification have a positive effect on
household technical efficiency suggesting that institutional reforms to improve access to
labour and credit markets can allow a more efficient use of farm household resources.
This chapter begins with a discussion of alternative concepts of efficiency, exploring
the reasons behind the focus on farm household technical efficiency. Some empirical and
theoretical considerations are also introduced as a foundation for the use of a household-
level analysis of technical efficiency. Section 2.3 provides a review of the relevant literature
while section 2.4 provides theoretical support for the use of a household-level analysis. This
is followed by the description of the non-parametric technique adopted for the estimation
of technical efficiency. Section 2.5 offers an overview of the data and presents the results
of the estimation of the technical efficiency scores. Section 2.6 describes the empirical
strategy adopted for the analysis of the determinants of household efficiency and discusses
the results. Finally section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 Background on efficiency
Farm household efficiency is a multidimensional concept that has been widely analysed
in the empirical literature and consists of two main components: technical and allocative
efficiency. This chapter focuses on farm household technical efficiency (TE) and adopts
a household-level approach that takes into account the role of non-farming activities.
The concept of technical efficiency is based on the identification of a production frontier
that represents the maximal combination of outputs attainable given an available set of
inputs. Farm households operating on the frontier are considered technically efficient while
those located below the frontier are considered inefficient. For a given input vector and
considering only two outputs, the production possibility frontier is depicted in figure 2.1.
The technical efficiency level of a farm located in P0 corresponds to TE = OP0/OB.
At this point output could be increased to B without requiring extra inputs, and the
household is considered inefficient.
Figure 2.1: Technical and allocative efficiency
Some considerations are required to reconcile the theoretical considerations above men-
tioned with the empirical possibilities. Methodological practicalities and the availability
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of data necessitate an adaptation of the concept of technical efficiency. The aim of any
empirical analysis of technical efficiency is to provide a measure that captures the rela-
tionship between the observed production and some ideal, or potential production (the
frontier). In principle, if all the possible combinations of inputs and outputs of production
are known, a measure of pure technical efficiency could be obtained that would be in line
with the above theoretical formulation. However, not all input-output combinations are
known, quality may not be observed and data are usually available only for a sample of
productive units. Therefore two main issues arise.
First, because it is not possible to observe the ideal or potential productive frontier, this
concept needs to be adapted to what is observable and measurable. Departing from the
underlying theoretical proposition that no units can exceed the ideal level of production,
two main practices are conventionally adopted to obtain an estimate of the productive
frontier: a) assuming a specific functional form for the relationship between inputs and
outputs, b) considering the best performing units in the sample as forming the frontier.
Second, the interpretation of inefficiency scores need to be adapted to the availability
of information on each farm in the sample. The assumption of homogenous inputs and
outputs is necessary when their quality is not observed. By neglecting differences in input
and output varieties, these unobservable characteristics contribute to the variation in the
observed (estimated) efficiency. If, for example, better quality inputs are classified as
homogenous with lower quality ones, they are likely to lead to higher observed technical
efficiency. Moreover, the use of aggregate product and input values raises some concerns
that will be discussed in section 2.4.1.
In general, because the concept of technical efficiency needs to be adapted to accom-
modate empirical possibilities and the availability of data, caution needs to be used in
the interpretation of efficiency scores. Although they may not capture pure technical effi-
ciencies, i.e. pure technical and engineering relationships, they provide, however, a useful
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representation of the variation in the intensity and effort in the use of observed inputs
across farm households (Carter, 1984). In the rest of this chapter, I will refer to this
modified interpretation of technical efficiency as ‘observed technical efficiency’. Besides
these general considerations, additional issues arise in relation to the specific method of
estimation adopted and will be discussed with the empirical methodology.
Before introducing the use of a household-level measure of technical efficiency, it is ne-
cessary to explain why farm household allocative efficiency (AE) has not been considered
in this chapter. Allocative efficiency reflects the ability to choose the optimal proportion of
inputs or outputs given their prices and the farm household technology (Coelli et al., 2005).
A household is considered to be allocatively efficient if it is minimising costs (or maximising
revenues). Considering figure 2.1, the line AA’ represents the isorevenue curve. Allocative
efficiency is measured as the ratio between the revenues associated with the technical effi-
cient output vector, point B, and those associated with the revenue efficient output levels,
point C, that is AE = OB/OC. Because the estimation of allocative efficiency requires
information on either input or output prices, some concerns arise. Besides the fact that
obtaining prices for composite products or inputs may be a challenging and controversial
task, the analysis of allocative efficiency in agriculture also raises some conceptual issues.
Barret (1997), for example, points out that small farmers make consumption, produc-
tion and labour supply decisions simultaneously on the basis of household specific shadow
prices which differ from market prices. Using market prices in the estimation of allocative
efficiency, pure allocative inefficiencies are confounded with misallocations caused by the
presence of market imperfections. Although the concept can be adapted to embrace both
sources of inefficiencies, the centrality of prices in the estimation of allocative efficiency
remains a major concern. This chapter focuses on technical efficiency, whose estimation
does no require information on prices although the use of aggregate values is sometimes
required. This latter issue will be discussed below.
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In this chapter I adopt a household-level measure of technical efficiency which takes
into account the role of off-farm activities. Conventional analyses of farm household tech-
nical efficiency are, in contrast, conducted at farm level. Section 2.4 shows that when
farm households engage in multiple activities, a farm-level analysis of technical efficiency
is appropriate only if the following conditions apply: a) there are no technical interde-
pendencies between farming and non-farming activities, i.e. skills acquired off-farm do
not affect farm management; b) family and hired labour are perfect substitutes, and c)
the farm household is not liquidity-constrained. If these conditions do not hold, farming
and non-farming activities can be considered part of a joint production process. In gen-
eral, while a farm level analysis could be appropriate when all of the above conditions are
satisfied, a household-level analysis does not require such assumptions and, at the same
time, can capture the reciprocal relationships between farming and non-farming activities
that characterise the livelihood of rural households. Moreover, from an operational point
of view, it does not require a distinction between labour employed on- and off-farm. It
is, in fact, not always possible to separate the amount of hours worked on- and off-farm;
in particular, the survey used in this chapter does not provide such information. On the
other hand, data on the number of household members of working age are usually available
in most surveys and in the one used here.
2.3 Literature review
The efficiency of South African farmers have been studied by Piesse et al. (1996) and
Van Zyl et al. (1995). They find that inadequate land size causes efficiency losses for
households in the three homelands of KaNgwane, Lebowa and Venda. The analysis of
South African farm households’ efficiency is extended here using a household-level ap-
proach with a particular focus on liquidity aspects and income diversification.
This chapter follows the work of Chavas et al. (2005), who show that in the presence of
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market imperfections or when farming and non-farming technologies are joint, farm and
off-farm decisions are non-separable and a household-level analysis of technical efficiency
is more appropriate than a farm-level analysis. This approach has also been adopted
by Fletschner (2008), Fletschner and Zepeda (2002), Anriquez and Daidone (2008) and
Fernandez-Cornejo (2007). This chapter extends the analysis of the relevance of market
imperfections in the estimation of technical efficiency at farm household-level using the
concept of jointness usually adopted in multi-product agricultural productions. Chavas
et al. (2005) estimate technical efficiency using a non-parametric technique and, in the
second part of the paper, several explanatory variables are considered in the analysis of the
factors influencing household efficiency. Various measures of access to financial resources
are considered, including income from off-farm activities. However, the identification of
such effects is not discussed. In this chapter a liquidity effect is identified exploiting
the age eligibility criteria adopted by the South African Old Age Pension Program and
instrumental variable techniques are adopted to identify the effect of income diversification
on household technical efficiency.
As anticipated, the impact of access to liquidity is analysed considering the pension
transfer provided by the South Africa OAP to all women over age 60 and men over age 65.
Through this analysis, this paper contributes to the current debate on the effects of the
OAP on household behaviour. One of the controversies lies on whether the pension induces
an income effect that reduces recipient and, possibly, other family members’ labour supply.
On the other hand, when the household faces a credit constraint, the pension can have a
positive effect on labour supply, enabling farm investment and financing job searching, also
through migration. On one side Bertrand et al. (2003) argues that the pension transfer
has a negative effect on the labour supply of the prime age adults living with a pensioner,
the impact differs according to the age and gender of the individuals. Ranchhod (2006)
also finds a negative effect of the pension on the labour supply of the beneficiaries. On the
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other side, Klasen (2008) finds no effect of the pension income on the reservation wage of
the unemployed and Jensen (2004) finds no evidence that households reduce labour supply
when they receive the pension. Moreover, Posel et al. (2006) and Ardington et al. (2009)
questioned the findings in Bertrand et al. (2003), arguing that once migrants are included
in the analysis the results change considerably. This chapter attempts to further address
this issue by focusing on farm households which have the peculiar characteristic of being
a supplier and an employer of labour at the same time. The relationship between pension
and labour supply is analysed from a different perspective. As it will be discussed below,
in the empirical estimation of technical efficiency, forced by data limitations, I consider
the number of adult family members, instead of the number of hours worked, as input
in the production of on and off-farm outputs. In this context, a negative labour supply
effect will imply a negative impact of pension receipt on technical efficiency since labour
inputs are left unproductive. On the other hand, if households are liquidity constrained,
access to the transfer is expected to improve household technical efficiency, for example,
by enabling the use of more expensive and higher quality inputs and factors or by allowing
households to overcome the entry barriers in the labour market. However, if pension
receipt partly crowds out private transfers such as remittances, as analysed in Jensen
(2004), the potential income and liquidity effects are neutralised.
2.4 Technical efficiency at farm household-level
Conventional analyses of technical efficiency at farm level have generally neglected the
linkages between household farm and non-farm activities produced by technical interde-
pendencies and market imperfections. As suggested by Chavas et al. (2005) the use of a
household-level analysis of technical efficiency relies on the argument that on and off-farm
activities are jointly produced. This section starts with a formal definition of the concept
of joint production as applied to multi-product firms. The definition is then applied to
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farm and non-farm activities at household-level. In the second part of this section, I
analyse how access to liquidity and income diversification can impact household observed
technical efficiency.
Originally, the definition of joint production applied to multi-product firms referred to
multiple outputs that cannot be produced separately, but are joined by the use of common
non-allocable or public inputs (c1). Public inputs, once acquired to produce one output,
are available costlessly for the production of other outputs (Baumol et al., 1982). Common
examples are wool and mutton from sheep or wheat and straw. A second commonly cited
cause of joint production is the presence of technical interdependences (c2), for example,
when the pesticide used in a field affects the yields of the nearby field. These conditions
are still regarded as primary causes of jointness. In addition, several authors (Shumway
et al. (1984), Moschini (1989) and Leathers (1991)) consider the presence of multiple
outputs competing for an allocable input that is fixed at the productive unit level (c3) as
an additional source of jointness in production.
I will here follow Lau (1972) to provide a formal definition of joint production that
will be related to the above mentioned causes of jointness. According to Lau (1972) two
types of jointness can be identified: jointness in outputs and jointness in inputs:
- A production function F (y1, y2;x, z) = 0 with two outputs, y1 and y2, and two inputs,
x and z, is said to be non-joint in inputs if there exist individual production functions
y1 = f1(x1, z1) and y2 = f2(x2, z2) such that F (y1, y1;x, z) = 0 if and only if x1 +x2 = x
and z1 + z2 = z. That is to say that separate production functions can be obtained for
each of the products and no inputs simultaneously contribute to the production of the
two goods (Leathers, 1991).
- The same production function is said to be non-joint in outputs if there exist indi-
vidual input requirement functions x = gx(y1x, y2x) and z = gz(y1z, y2z) such that
F (y1, y1;x, z) = 0 if and only if y1x + y1z = y1 and y2x + y2z = y2. That is to say that
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separate input requirement functions can be obtained for each of the input. According
to Shumway et al. (1984) this condition is rarely descriptive of real world, therefore, I
will focus on the first type of jointness.
The definitions above provide a mathematical representation of joint production but
are not easily testable, therefore alternative behavioural propositions are provided in Lau
(1972) and are reported below. A necessary and sufficient condition for non-jointness in
inputs is for the profit function to be additively separable in outputs:
Π =
∑
i
pipii(w/pi, r/pi), (2.1)
where pii refers to the profit function of output i, w and r are the prices of input x and z
respectively. The maximised profit has the following property:
∂Π2
∂pi∂pj
=
∂y∗i
∂pj
= 0, i 6= j. (2.2)
Where y∗i is the optimal level of output i. According to equation 2.2, the two outputs
are attained from a non-joint production process if the supply of a good is affected by
changes in its own price but not in the price of the other product. While it is possible to
see that the above conditions are violated in the presence of non-allocable inputs (c1) and
technical interdependencies (c2) within a multiple output production process, a further
step must be taken in order to explore how the presence of fixed allocable inputs (c3) can
lead to jointness in production. Following Shumway et al. (1984), when a constraint on
the total amount of inputs available is introduced (z¯ = z1 + z2) the problem becomes:
max
xi,zi,λ
Π =
∑
i
pifi(xi, zi)− wxi
s.t. z1 + z2 = z¯,
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where the two production functions fi(xi, zi) are considered independent for simplicity.
The Lagrangian of this problem is:
L = p1f1(x1, z1) + p2f2(x2, z2)− w(x1 + x2)− λ(z¯ − z1 − z2),
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the input availability constraint. The
solutions of this problem are the optimal input allocations, x∗i (w, p1, p2, z¯) and z
∗
i (w, p1, p2, z¯),
and the endogenous price of the fixed input λ∗(w, p1, p2, z¯). Once the optimal demand
for inputs are substituted to obtain the optimal output supplies, y∗i (w, p1, p2, z¯) and
y∗2(w, p1, p2, z¯), it is possible to notice that equation 2.2 is violated since the supply of
one output is not independent of changes in the price of the other output.
The above definition can be applied to farm and non-farm activities. In particular,
three conditions can possibly lead to jointness between farm and non-farm production:
d1) there are technical interdependencies and non-allocatable inputs within farming and
non farming technologies, d2) family and hired labour are imperfect substitutes and d3)
the household is liquidity constrained.
The first condition usually emerged when skills acquired off-farm improve farm manage-
ment (Chavas et al., 2005). Ravallion (2003) points out the importance of externalities for
rural development given the fact that most rural households engage in multiple activities.
By engaging in off-farm activities, for example, farmers can learn about new techniques of
production (Feder and Slade (1985), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995)), bookkeeping and fin-
ance management. In particular, the presence of local non-farm industries that encourage
the acquisition of knowledge and skills can also benefit local farmers at household-level,
through knowledge sharing within the household (Basu et al., 2002). Moreover some pub-
lic inputs can be shared between farm and non-farm activities, for example, the housing
infrastructure, food provision and equipments such as vehicles and other tools.
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The imperfect substitutability between family and hired labour (point d2) is usually
induced by the presence of transaction costs in the labour market. Regarding this latter
aspects, the presence of supervision and other transaction costs, give family labour specific
features that distinguish it from hired labour. In this context, family labour can be
considered as a quasi - fixed allocable input in the short run since no perfect substitutes
are available. In general, the presence of multiple outputs competing for a limited amount
of inputs implies that the production of one output reduces the availability of resources
and has a negative effect on the production of the other output. This argument applies
to the allocation of family labour between on and off-farm activities and implies the
jointness between farm and non-farming activities. The last aspect (point d3) is related
to the presence of a binding liquidity constraint. Farming decisions are constrained by
the availability of financial resources. In this case, off-farm earnings can promote farm
production by relaxing the on farm liquidity constraint leading again to the jointness
between farm and non-farm activities.
In general, while a farm production function can be entirely separated from the non-
farm production function when none of the above conditions applies, a joint household-level
analysis does not require such assumptions. In practice, this also refers to the ability of
quantifying the separate amount of inputs used for farm and non-farm activities. The
difficulty of obtaining data on activity specific inputs partly arises from the joint nature
of the two production processes as described above. Using standard surveys, for example,
externalities between on and non-farm activities cannot be measured. Moreover, inputs
are not usually recorded with sufficient detail (distinction between hours worked on and
off-farm) and, because their allocation is affected by seasonality, often, only the total
quantities available at household-level can be observed. Therefore, both the inherent
jointness between farm and non-farm activities and the data limitations suggest the use
of a household-level analysis of technical efficiency.
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In the remaining of this section I will analyse how access to liquidity and income
diversification affect household observed technical efficiency. As anticipated, because not
all inputs, outputs and their quality are observed, unobservable factors contribute to the
variation in the estimated level of technical efficiency across households. The use of low
quality inputs, for example, can result in technical inefficiencies although the timing and
the method of production employed are optimal. The following discussion refers to the
this definition of observed technical efficiency.
Access to transfers, such as pensions, can produce alternative effects. First, in the
presence of a binding liquidity constraint, the transfer can help ease the constraint and
allow the purchase of new technological packages that can increase the amount of output
produced and therefore the observed technical efficiency. The household, for example,
might be able to purchase higher yielding seeds or adopt a more remunerative cropping
mix and increase production (Carter, 1989). Moreover, access to liquidity may help farmers
to better cope with adverse shocks and afford the costs of entering better quality and more
remunerative jobs, such as the cost of equipments, rents and skill acquisition. Dercon and
Krishnan (1996), for example, found that entry constraints are important determinants
of the choice of income portfolio for rural households in Tanzania and Ethiopia. Even
when the transfer is not used for productive purposes, but for food consumption, it can
induce a more intensive use of land and family labour if the improved nutritional levels
of family members are translated into higher labour productivities. On the other hand, a
negative impact can also be observed and is specific to the methodology adopted for the
estimation of technical efficiency. Because in the estimation of technical efficiency, that
will be described in the next section, I consider the overall number of family members
rather than the hours worked as inputs of production, labour supply effects can also be
captured. Exogenous transfers can produce an income effect that reduces household labour
supply. In this case, a negative effect of the transfer on technical efficiency is expected
49
since labour inputs are left unproductive. Finally, if the pension receipt partly crowds out
private transfers such as remittances, as analysed in Jensen (2004), the potential income
and liquidity effects are neutralised.
A similar analysis can be conducted for the impact of off-farm earnings on household
technical efficiency. Non - farming activities can have a positive effect on technical effi-
ciency mainly because: a) non farm earnings can provide liquidity to the household and
produce similar effects to those reported above, b) skills acquired off-farm can generate
positive knowledge spillovers improving farmers’ managerial ability. On the other hand,
a negative effect is expected when off-farm opportunities subtract time for farm manage-
ment therefore preventing the adoption of management-intensive innovations. Moreover if
diversification is the result of a income-smoothing strategy, case studies have shown that
lower risk is often obtained at the cost of lower incomes (Dercon, 2002). Which effects
prevail is an empirical question1 and will be discussed in the next sections.
2.4.1 Measuring technical efficiency
There are two main approaches to the estimation of technical efficiency. In this chapter,
farm household technical efficiency is estimated using a non-parametric approach known
as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Before describing the estimation procedure I will
briefly introduce the most common alternative method of estimation, the parametric
stochastic frontier analysis.
The stochastic frontier approach has been introduced by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt
(1977) and Meesen and van den Broek (1977). This method econometrically estimates the
production frontier by explicitly specifying the functional form of the production function,
1Goodwin and Mishra (2004) for example, using a farm level efficiency analysis finds that the involve-
ment in off-farm activities decreases farm efficiency for a sample of US farms. The analysis, however is not
extended at household-level. Fletschner and Zepeda (2002) find a positive effect of income diversification
on allocative efficiency using data on rural farm households in eastern Paraguay.
50
f(x, β):
yi = f(x, β) · TEi · evi .
The observed level of output, yi, is therefore given by a deterministic component f(x, β),
a standard random error, evi , capturing measurement error and other random factors out
of farm control and a random component representing technical efficiency, TEi. This lat-
ter factor is bounded to be positive and lower than one and measures the distance from
the frontier. The identification of the two error components requires some distributional
assumptions since only the aggregate term is estimated. This method has the advantage
of distinguishing between pure inefficiency and unobserved random noise and can also be
easily adapted to exploit longitudinal data. On the other side, misspecifications of the func-
tional form can be erroneously interpreted as inefficiencies and no methods are available to
deal with multiple outputs other than using an output aggregator. Moreover, the presence
of zero-valued inputs is troublesome when using the most common functional forms that
require logarithmic transformations: Cobb-Douglas or trans-log. Common solutions are
arbitrary manipulations of the data, for example by adding small constant values to the
input variables, which however could lead to bias estimates. In addition inputs could be
considered perfect substitutes and aggregated or alternative functional forms can be used
that can accommodate zero-valued inputs. A functional form chosen merely on the basis of
data requirements, however, might not appropriately describe the underlying production
process and could rise problems of misspecification of the production function.
The method adopted here, DEA, is a deterministic approach that has been first intro-
duced by Charnes et al. (1978). In contrast with the previous method, this approach does
not impose restrictions on the underlying farm technology 2. This methodology is more
2The statistical properties of the estimator have been analysed in Banker (1993) where its consistency
is proved. However, since the estimates are obtained from a finite sample, they are sensitive to sampling
variations. Simar and Wilson (1998) propose a bootstrapping technique to estimate confidence intervals
for efficiency scores that reveal their sensitiveness to sample variation
51
suitable for the analysis conducted here mainly because of its adaptability to multiple in-
puts and outputs that can be quantified using different units of measurement3. Moreover,
at the same time, DEA does not require the distinction between the amount of labour
employed on and off-farm that is not available in the survey used. However, because it
is a deterministic approach, deviations from the frontier are all attributed to inefficiency.
Therefore, for example, it fails to take into consideration differences in environmental and
weather conditions. However, as far as this chapter is concerned, the use of data on the
KwaZulu-Natal province only, restricts the potential variation in such aspects4.
DEA models can be either input or output oriented. While the two measures are
equivalent under constant returns to scale, they differ when variable returns to scale are
assumed. The input-oriented approach considers a proportional contraction in the use of
inputs given the level of outputs. The output-oriented approach measures the proportional
expansion of outputs that could be attained given the available inputs (Coelli et al., 2005).
In this chapter I opted for a output oriented analysis since most of the inputs considered,
such as land and family labour cannot be easily increased or decreased in the short run
according to production requirements.
The farm household technology can be represented by the following technology set
F (yq, yn;X,H,L) such that family labour (L), hired labour (H) and other inputs (X)
can produce the farm and non farm outputs, yq and yn. Technical efficiency (TE) is
intended as the distance of the household input/output bundle to the multi-input multi-
output productive frontier constructed using the information on all the farm households
in the sample. Given the presence of multi inputs and outputs, the empirical estimation
3An alternative way to handle multiple inputs and outputs is the use of stochastic input or output
distance functions (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). These methods, however, require the use of logarithmic
transformations that are not suitable for this analysis since most of the input and output variables have
zero entries and the use of arbitrary measures, such as replacing zeros with very small numbers, would be
necessary and questionable.
4Moreover a set of sensitivity exercises are conducted to understand the sensitivity of DEA estimates.
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of technical efficiency, discussed in the next section, is based on the concept of output
distance function:
TE = min{φ : F (yq/φ, yn/φ;X,H,L) = 0}.
Following the DEA approach the productive frontier is computed as the larger upper
bound set of all the possible input - output combinations. The frontier, therefore, is
composed by the best performing farm households in the sample. Because it is likely
to be sensitive to outliers, I employ the method proposed by Wilson (1993) to eliminate
the identified outliers5. The output oriented technical efficiency is based on obtaining
an optimal set of weights from the maximisation of each household’s ratio of all outputs
and inputs, given by µ′iyi/ν
′
izi, where yi and zi are the vectors of M outputs and N
inputs of firm i. The associated vector of weights, µi (Mx1) and νi (Nx1) are obtained by
solving the mathematical programming model reported below, where household efficiency
is maximised subject to other firms’ efficiency measures being lower than 1.
max
µi,νi
µ′iyi
ν ′ixi
s.t
µ′iyj
ν ′ixj
≤ 1 j = 1, 2...I,
µi, νi ≥ 0
This linear programming model is solved for each of the I households in the sample
so that each unit is assigned a set of weights that is most favourable to them. Departing
from this base specification a normalisation is imposed, ν ′xi = 1, to ensure the existence
of a unique solution to the model. The problem can be represented in its envelopment
5Outliers are defined as observations with very low probability. The elimination of 11 outliers does
not affect significantly the average estimated technical efficiency that only changed slightly. Moreover, the
elimination of outliers does not alter the general results obtained in the second stage analysis.
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(dual) form where φi is a scalar associated to firm i, and λi is a (Ix1) vector of constants.
max
φi,λi
φi,
s.t − φiyi + Yλi ≥ 0,
xi −Xλi ≥ 0.
λi ≥ 0,
where X is the (NxI) matrix of inputs and Y is the (MxI) matrix of outputs of all house-
holds in the sample. The measure of technical efficiency is given by 1/φi. The dual problem
is solved for each of the I households in the sample. Intuitively each problem maximises
the radial expansion of the output vector of firm i while remaining within the feasible
output set. The projected point (Xλi,Yλi) is a linear combination of the observed data
points. The elements of the vector λi are non-zero in correspondence to those households
that form part of the relevant part of the frontier. In the one-input two-output case de-
picted in figure 2.2, the projected point for household A is the point A’ and the element
of the vector λA are non-zero in correspondence to households B and C (that are usually
referred to as peers). The scalar φA captures the distance between A and the projected
point A’.
Figure 2.2: Output oriented DEA
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Before proceeding to the estimation of technical efficiency, a choice needs to be made
about the use of variable or constant returns to scale in the estimation of the produc-
tion frontier. The two options are depicted in figure 2.3 using a one-input one-output
production technology where P0 and P1 are two households. The presence of market im-
perfections (in particular the absence of the land market) and constraints on liquidity
are likely to cause households to not operate at optimal scale, that is the household is
unable to become more productive by changing the scale of operation. The use of con-
stant returns to scale (CRS) implies a linear production frontier hence, as shown in figure
2.3, only household P1 would be considered technically efficient. Household P0 is not op-
erating at optimal scale since it could become more productive by changing its scale of
operation. Using a CRS production frontier technical inefficiency is confounded with scale
efficiency that measures whether the household is operating at the most productive scale.
When using variable returns to scale (VRS), in contrast, P0 and P1 are both considered
technically efficient although they are not equally productive as indicated by the dashed
line. Therefore, when markets are not perfectly competitive, a VRS frontier is preferable
since technical efficiency measures are not affected by the use of an inadequate scale of
operation.
Figure 2.3: Variable versus constant returns to scale
The production possibility frontier is, therefore, estimated using VRS by including
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the constraint I1′λi = 1, where I1 is a vector of ones, that is the projected point for each
household is a convex combination of the corresponding peers (in contrast of being a linear
combination). This ensures that each household is compared with households of similar
scale. The role of the convexity constraint is better explained using a simple example
considering 5 households producing one output (y) and employing one input (x).
Table 2.1: Example of DEA under constant and variable returns to scale
Variable returns to scale Constant return to scale
Unit Y X Peers λ (λX; λY) TE Peers λ (λX; λY) TE
H1 1 2 H1 1 (2;1) 1 H2 0.67 (2;2) 0.50
H2 3 3 H2 1 (3;3) 1 H2 1 (3;3) 1
H3 2 4 H2,H5 0.67, 0.33 (4;3.6) 0.55 H2 1.33 (4;4) 0.50
H4 4 5 H2,H5 0.33, 0.67 (4.3;5) 0.92 H2 1.67 (5;5) 0.80
H5 5 6 H5 1 (6;5) 1 H2 2 (6;6) 0.83
Considering the estimates reported in table 2.1, the presence of the convexity constraint
in the VRS method is confirmed by the facts that the estimated λ add up to one (column
5). Considering for example household H3, the projected point in the VRS case is a convex
combination of its peers H5 and H2 while, in the CRS case, the projected point is a linear
combination of the peer H2, as depicted in figure 2.4. It is possible to notice that, in
the CRS case, all households in the sample are compared to household H2 independently
of the size of operation. In contrast, under VRS, households are benchmarked to peers
that are closer in terms of size and the convexity constraint ensures that a lower weight
is given to the more distant households. Considering again household H3 a lower weight
is attributed to the peer H5 since the difference in size, in absolute terms, between H3 an
H5 is larger than that between H3 an H2.
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Figure 2.4: Example: variable versus constant returns to scale
2.5 Household technical efficiency in KwaZulu Natal
The analysis of technical efficiency has been conducted using the third wave (2004) of the
KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamic Survey (KIDS)6. The KIDS is a comprehensive household
survey that includes information on household characteristics, expenditure, income and
farming activities. A sample of 547 farm households has been used for the estimation of
technical efficiency7 .
About 80% of farm households produces maize which is often grown together with
other cereals, vegetables and fruits. About 60% of the farms own some livestock and are
engaged in animal husbandry. Farms are in general small and the average land size is
of about 1.4 hectares. Farm households rely also on off-farm earnings and about 53%
6KIDS data have been collected thanks to following collabourating institutions: University of KwaZulu-
Natal (UKZN), the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI) However, in order to accommodate new areas of interest, the participating institutions have been
broadened to include the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) and the Norwegian
Institute of Urban and Regional Studies (NIBR). In addition to the resources provided by each of the
collabourating institutions, the study was funded by the UK Department for International Development
(DFID) through DSD, the National Research Foundation, the Norwegian Research Council, USAID and
the Mellon Foundation.
7The initial sample of farm households, including all households conducting agricultural activities, have
been reduced following the method proposed by Wilson (1993) in order to eliminate few outliers.
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are involved in casual or permanent off-farm activities which constitutes an important
component of overall household income. Non-farming earnings, excluding income from
pensions, other transfers and remittances, contributes to the 58% of total income. Only
15% of households employes hired labour and about 30% do not use fertilisers, sprays or
purchased seeds. The survey do not provide specific information on the credit status of the
household, however only 20% of the households have access to formal credit, in particular
only 5% has received a loan from a bank or building society. This evidence supports the
presence of limited access to credit facilities for the households.
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of variables used for efficiency estimation
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Outputs
Maize (in kg) 326 17.46 56.72 0.02 625.00
Vegetables (value in RAND) 388 38.34 98.74 0.07 870.83
Fruits (value in RAND) 71 27.08 48.65 0.12 301.25
Others (value in RAND) 121 8.97 23.88 0.25 250.00
Income from animals (in RAND) 294 146.24 299.04 0.13 2710.42
off-farm income (in RAND) 298 2272.72 2593.80 20.00 13267.0
Inputs
Male members (in adult equivalent) 518 2.24 1.37 0.10 9.40
Female members (in adult equivalent) 542 2.56 1.59 0.30 12.00
Land (hectares) 557 1.38 7.04 0.00 75.00
Hired labour (number of workers) 80 1.629 2.51 0.08 14.83
Livestock (Tropical livestock unit) 340 2.10 3.71 0.01 35.00
Cost of inputs (value in RAND) 386 37.15 71.00 0.25 1016.6
The estimation of technical efficiency employes 6 outputs and 6 inputs which are re-
ported in table 2.2. The number of inputs and outputs used in the estimation of technical
efficiency, relatively to the sample size, affects the shape of the efficiency frontier. The
higher the number of inputs and outputs included in the estimation of technical efficiency
the higher the number of households identified as efficient. At the same time, however,
excluding some variables, for example those capturing the quality of inputs and outputs,
can increase the bias of the estimates. In the light of this trade off and of the previously
mentioned limitations of the observed technical efficiency measure, I opt for the choice of a
minimum common set of inputs and outputs for the first stage estimation of technical effi-
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ciency, leaving quality related variables for the second stage analysis presented in the next
section. The total production of maize has been measured in kilograms while vegetables,
fruits and others products have been aggregated using farm level prices when available
and median prices at district level otherwise. An additional aggregate output includes
the revenues from the sale of animals, meat and animal products such as eggs and milk.
Finally, off-farm income includes the earnings from regular and casual employment. Other
forms of non-agricultural self employment have not been considered since data were not
reliable. The set of inputs includes the number of male and female adults which have been
computed using the equivalence scale proposed by Deere and de Janvry (1981)8. Land
represents the total surface devoted to farming activities while hired labour is measured
using the number of permanent and temporary workers employed on the farm. The cost
of inputs include the cost of seeds, fertilisers, sprays, ploughing and veterinary expenses.
Finally livestocks has been measured in tropical livestock unit (TLU) which is a standard
procedure used to aggregate across different species9. It is worth noting that the aggrega-
tion of inputs and outputs into aggregate categories such as labour, capital and purchased
inputs using farm level prices introduces an additional conceptual issue. Technical ineffi-
ciency measures can be confounded with allocative errors between individual inputs and
outputs within aggregate categories10 (Ali and Byerlee, 1991).
The summary results of the estimation of technical efficiency are reported in table
2.311. Efficiency estimates are low, the average estimates of technical efficiency are lower
then those reported in Piesse et al. (1996). However, DEA estimates largely depend on
8This procedure attributes a weight of 0 to members aged below 3, 0.1 to children aged between 3 and
5, 0.3 to members aged between 5 and 8 and over 75, 0.5 to those aged between 8 and 12 and between 65
and 75, 0.8 to those aged between 13 and 17 and between 59 and 65 and 1 to the remaining members aged
between 17 and 59.
9Cattle correspond to 1 TLU while sheeps and goats correspond to 0.7 TLU.
10In particular, Fare et al. (2004) show that when different types of inputs are aggregated using their
prices as weights, the technical efficiency scores will be biased downward and when different types of outputs
are aggregated using their prices as weights technical efficiency scores will be further biased downward.
11These estimates have been obtained using the package FEAR for R (Wilson, 2007).
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Table 2.3: Technical efficiency by district municipalities
District Obs Technical % Efficient
efficiency
Ugu 69 0.41 21.73
Umgungundlovu 27 0.44 22.22
Uthukela 64 0.41 18.75
Umzinyathi 28 0.31 7.14
Amajuba 39 0.42 17.94
Zululand 71 0.28 8.45
Uthungulu 94 0.40 17.02
iLembe 17 0.39 17.64
Vhembe 47 0.50 21.27
eThekwini 93 0.44 23.65
Total 547 0.40 18.03
the characteristics and size of the sample considered. Therefore, comparisons with other
findings are not possible. Considering for example the Ugu district, the average farm
household can possibly increase output by 59% without changing the bundle of inputs
employed. Because this analysis considers also off-farm activities together with conven-
tional farm outputs, high inefficiencies could also signal the presence of barriers to non
farm employment. This will be analysed in the next section where the determinants of
technical efficiency are explored. Before proceeding to the analysis of the determinants of
technical efficiency, few exercises are conducted to understand the sensitivity of technical
efficiency estimates to the choice of alternative input and output bundles and of sample
variations. When skilled and unskilled family members are considered as separated input
of production average technical efficiency increases to 0.49. This increase is equally dis-
tributed across districts. As previously mentioned the use of a higher number of inputs
(or outputs), relatively to the sample size, in the estimation of technical efficiency leads
to a higher number of households identified as ‘efficient’. This is confirmed since 26% of
the households are considered efficient when family labor is distinguished by education
attainments. On the other hand, the omission of this distinction increases the bias of the
estimates. The fact that the average technical efficiency estimates do not change notably,
i.e. the average technical efficiency remains low, however suggests that failing to account
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for difference in labor quality at this stage of the analysis does not significantly alter the
overall picture. Therefore labor quality differences will be analysed in the second stage
analysis proposed in the next section.
The DEA method does not account for variations in weather or environmental condi-
tions across districts that are therefore capture by the efficiency measures. To investigate
whether the presence of districts with particularly favourable (or unfavourable) conditions
are significantly affecting the estimates, technical efficiency scores have been re-estimated
excluding each district at a time12. The average estimates varies between 0.40, excluding
ILembe district municipality, and 0.47, excluding eThekwini district municipality, which
are the smallest and the largest district in the sample. The variation in the average es-
timates seems, therefore, to be mainly driven by the reduction in the sample size rather
then by the presence of particular district-specific characteristics that could significantly
affect the estimates. In addition the analysis of the determinants of technical efficiency will
control for common characteristics at district municipality level. Finally, I also computed
bias-corrected estimates using the bootstrapping method proposed by Simar and Wilson
(1998) with 2000 replications and obtained a very similar average estimate of 0.37. This
bootstrapping method repeatedly estimates technical efficiency scores on random samples
obtained by simulating the true data generating process. However, because this method
seems to be quite sensitive to the choice of the initial random value for the drawing of
random samples it is here used only for comparison.
The exercises conducted in this section add some confidence on the estimates of tech-
nical efficiency obtained using the DEA method. These estimates are employed in the next
section to analyse the factor determining the variation in the observed technical efficiency
12Technical efficiency scores have also been re-estimated excluding very large farms (above 50 hectares,
1% of the sample) and the average technical efficiency differs only in the third decimal place. These
households have also been excluded from the second stage analysis during robustness checks and their
exclusion does not affect the results.
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across households.
2.6 Analysis of factors affecting technical efficiency
In the analysis of the determinants of technical efficiency, the efficiency estimates are re-
gressed on a set of contextual factors usually considered in the literature such as human
capital and other household and market characteristics. In contrast with the inputs and
outputs variables considered in the estimation of technical efficiency, these factors are
intended to capture differences in managerial abilities and access to factor markets that
affect household decision making. There is an ongoing debate on the use of this two stage
procedure that involves the estimation of technical efficiency scores, in the first step, and
regressions to relate efficiency scores to contextual factors in the second. On one side,
Simar and Wilson (2007) argue that efficiency scores are serially correlated and proposed
a seven step double bootstrapping procedure to produce consistent estimates in the second
stage. While this approach has been adopted in the literature, it has not received general
consensus. McDonald (2009) argues that it is valid only under the proposed data gen-
erating process and not robust to reasonable departures from it. Moreover, Banker and
Natarajan (2008) provide statistical foundation for the simple two-stage procedure. Their
simulation results indicate that a two-stage DEA based approach performs better than a
commonly adopted set of one-stage and two-stage parametric procedures. However, hypo-
thesis testing is not discussed. Given the computational complexity of Simar and Wilson
(2007) approach, the drawbacks identified by McDonald (2009) and the arguments pro-
posed by Banker and Natarajan (2008), I opted for a simple two stage procedure which has
also been extensively adopted in the literature. The variables considered are reported in
table 2.4 together with the descriptive statistics. Human capital endowments are repres-
ented by the age and education of the household head and by the ratio of skilled members
over overall adult family members. The regressions also include a dummy variable in-
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dicating whether the household has the title deeds on the land. Finally the employment
rate at municipality level is intended to partially capture the presence of transaction costs
and the degree of development of the local labour market. The employment rate has been
constructed using data from the 2001 South Africa population census on 10% of total pop-
ulation. All regressions include district dummies to control for variations in environmental
conditions and soil quality.
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the efficiency analysis
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Access to labour market and liquidity
Share off-farm income 547 30.89 34.27 0 100
Household eligibility (HE) 547 0.39 0.49 0 1
Employment rate (municipality level) 547 42.96 13.32 20.86 73.68
Household characteristics
Gender of household head (male) 547 0.51 0.59 0 1
Land title 547 0.28 0.45 0 1
Human capital
Age of household head 547 54.6 14.07 18 96
Education of household head 547 5.48 4.82 0 20
Ratio of skilled adults 547 0.24 0.22 0 1
A particular focus is given to the role of credit market imperfections in limiting the
capacity of households to produce at higher levels of technical efficiency. One of the
main sources of liquidity is off-farm income which plays an important role in household
income formation. Therefore, the share of off-farm earnings on overall household income
is included as an additional explanatory variable. Another important source of liquidity
considered in the analysis is the receipt of a pension. The OAP in South Africa provides an
unconditional cash transfer to all women over age 60 and all men over age 65. The program
has been found to be effective in reaching poor households in rural areas and constitutes
the basis of credit facilities in local markets (Ardington et al., 2009). The transfer is
expected to have a relevant impact on household behaviour13 given its generosity. In Case
13Several studies have investigated the effects of the OAP on children health (Duflo, 2003), household
structure (Edmonds et al. (2005), Maitra and Ray (2003)) labour supply (Bertrand et al., 2003; Posel
et al., 2006; Ardington et al., 2009) and education (Edmonds, 2006).
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Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics on pension receipt and eligibility
Age groups % receiving Age groups % non receiving
the pension the pension
Male members
50-55 1.61 65-70 41.67
55-60 2.13 70-75 19.23
60-65 12.00 over 75 20.00
over 65 72.86
Female members
45-50 1.35 60-65 22.64
50-55 3.80 65-70 15.25
55-60 4.17 over 70 5.95
over 60 86.54
Households with an eligible member 39%
Households with an eligible man 11%
Households with an eligible woman 34%
Source: author’s calculation from 2004 KIDS Survey
and Deaton (1998) the authors find that the transfer is about twice the median per capita
income of an African household. The baseline model for the analysis of technical efficiency
is the following:
TEi = α+ βX + δPi + γOi + i,
where TEi indicates the technical efficiency scores estimated using the DEA method,
X is the vector of contextual variables described above, Oi represents the share of off-farm
earnings on total income and Pi indicates that there is a person receiving a pension in the
household.
Because pension take-up could be an endogenous household decision it generates a
potential source of endogeneity. Therefore, I consider pension eligibility rather than actual
pension receipt. The current South Africa Old Age Pension program is the result of the
extension to the black population of the white social pension system established during
the apartheid. The means test applied to the pension does not exclude most of the African
households. The monthly pre-means test transfer in 2004 is of 740 RAND. Individuals in
the sample receive an average pension transfer of about 719 RAND which suggests that,
in most cases, the means test is not effective. Moreover, because it is not based on family
income but only on recipient wealth there are no incentives to pre-pension arrangements.
64
This implies that pension eligibility depends only on the age of the recipient rather than
on past earnings or household composition. Household members are eligible at age 60
if female and 65 if male. About 40% of the households in the sample has a pensioner
member. The take-up rate is around 87% for women and 73% for men as reported in table
2.5. This ensures that the eligibility indicator is a good approximation of pension receipt.
The estimated equation is therefore:
TEi = α+ βX + δHEi + γOi + i,
were HEi indicates the presence of an eligible member in the household. This eligibility
indicator, however, could also capture age trends or differences in background which could
intensify or vanish the actual effect of the pension. This chapter allows for differences in
household technical efficiency with the age structure of the household by controlling for the
age of the oldest man and woman in the household and for the presence of adult male and
female members close to the eligibility age. This is done by including dummies indicating
the presence of female and male members over age 50 and 55 and male members over 6014.
Pensions in South Africa have been found to affect household composition. Edmonds et al.
(2005), exploiting the age-discontinuity in the structure of the pension program, finds and
increase in the number of children aged 0 - 5 and in the number of women aged 18 - 23
and a decrease in the number of women aged 30-39 associated with pension receipt. In
this chapter, a higher number of children in the household, for example, could lead to
a lower household technical efficiency since more time is needed for children rearing and
could therefore offset the possible benefits of having a pensioner in the family. To control
for household living arrangements due to pension receipt the regressions include variables
representing household size by age categories.
14This strategy has also been used in Duflo (2003) and Edmonds (2006).
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Additionally, because pension take-up differs from pension eligibility and varies between
men and women the effect of a pension receipt could be underestimated. To address this
issue I also report the results obtained by instrumenting the variable indicating the pres-
ence of a pensioner P̂ENSi using the number of eligible female and male members in the
household as reported below:
TEi = α+ βX + δP̂ENSi + γOi + i.
The model has been estimated using a standard linear regression model and a two
stage least squares estimator. The choice of this estimator, in contrast with the wide
use of tobit models for the analysis of the determinants of efficiency, is motivated by the
fact that technical efficiency scores should not be considered as censored values since they
are not supported by a latent model. These efficiency indexes are better described as
the result of a normalisation process imposed to ensure an unique solution to the linear
programming model15. Efficiency scores are therefore not truly censored data and are
better defined as fractional data (McDonald, 2009). The causal interpretation of tobit
results relies on distributional assumptions, namely normality and homoschedasticity of
the error term of the latent model. Because of the fractional nature of the technical
efficiency variables, the variance of the error term depends on the limit of the dependent
variable (TEi = 1)16 and therefore on the regressors (McDonald, 2009). This implies that
the error term is heterosckedastic and White’s standard errors need to be computed for
valid hypothesis testing using ordinary least squares (ols). In contrast, tobit estimates
are inconsistent in the presence of heterosckedasticity. Moreover, Hoff (2007), comparing
15The use of a tobit is also justified when the outcome is a corner solution which, however, is not the
case when considering efficiency scores.
16This is because no households scores zero in terms of technical efficiency. Considering the following
linear model: yi = xiβ + i where y cannot exceed 1, when y = 1 then  = 1 − xiβ with probability
p(y = 1). Therefore the variance of  involves a term related to the probability that y = 1 and therefore
depends on xi. The error term will usually be heteroschedastic.
66
tobit and linear regression results, finds that the latter is sufficient to represent second
step DEA models17. In the instrumental variable estimation (last specification), a dummy
variable indicating the presence of a pensioner in the household is instrumented using a
two stage least squares procedure. The use of a probit or logit model in the first stage
would lead to inconsistent results unless the first stage model is correctly specified. On
the other side, conventional two stage least squares models are consistent independently
of the non-linearity of the first stage (Kelejian (1971), Angrist (2001)). Therefore, I opted
for the use of a standard two stage least squares estimator that relies on a broader set of
assumptions.
2.6.1 Results
The analysis of the determinants of household technical efficiency shows a positive effect of
income diversification (table 2.6). This result is robust throughout all the specifications.
A rise of 10 percentage points in the share of off-farm income produces an increase of
0.02 to 0.04 units in technical efficiency. In other terms, the rise can cause a household
in the bottom of the distribution to lift to a higher decile of the distribution of technical
efficiency. This effect can indicate an easing of the liquidity constraint that allows the
household to undertake efficiency enhancement purchases or to overcome the entry bar-
riers to more profitable activities. At the same time, it could also signal the presence of
positive knowledge spillovers from off-farm to farming activities. These positive effects can
be reduced if off-farm opportunities subtract time for farm management preventing the
adoption of management-intensive innovations that could explain the relative small mag-
nitude of the coefficients. At this stage of the analysis it is not possible to disentangle the
alternative mechanisms through which income diversification affects technical efficiency.
17This is done by evaluating the Spearmans rank correlation coefficients between the predicted and
actual efficiency scores using alternative methods including ols and tobit models.
67
Neverthless, the positive sign on the pension eligibility coefficient confirms the presence of
a positive liquidity effect. This effect is relevant. Having a pension eligible person in the
household causes an increase in technical efficiency between 0.097 and 0.19 units that is
quite large if compared to the fact that 25% of the households report a technical efficiency
score lower than 0.10. Because the estimates of household technical efficiency consider
household members (in terms of adult equivalent) as inputs of production, in the presence
of a non binding liquidity constraint, a positive income effect would induce the household
to consume more leisure and reduce labour supply leading to a lower overall household
technical efficiency. In the presence of a binding liquidity constraint, instead, access to
liquidity can, for example, allow farmers to adopt new technology packages that can shift
the production surface (Carter, 1989). Because differences in the quality of inputs con-
tributes to the overall technical efficiency, the purchase of more costly high-yielding seeds
can shift the entire input-output relationship and lead to higher efficiency.
Column 4 reports the results of the two stage least squares estimation where the
variable indicating the presence of a pensioner is instrumented using the number of eligible
male and female members. The first stage regression, reported in the appendix, is strong
with a very large t statistic (above 80). The results reported in column 4 (table 2.6)
confirm the findings when differences between pension take-up and eligibility are taken
into account. The effect of pension receipt is larger than that previously found, suggesting
that the effect of the pension could have been underestimated due to the difference between
pension eligibility and actual pension receipt. The results also show a positive effect of the
employment rate at district level. This indicates that better access to job opportunities
can improve the efficiency of households.
Although remittances may constitute an additional source of liquidity, they are ex-
cluded from this analysis. A potential omitted variable bias problem could arise because
of a correlation between remittances and the receipt of the pension. If, for example, pen-
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Table 2.6: Analysis of household technical efficiency
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share off-farm income 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household eligibility 0.097* 0.096* 0.098* 0.188**
(0.054) (0.056) (0.057) (0.078)
Gender of household head (male) 0.007 0.034 0.089* 0.093**
(0.032) (0.042) (0.046) (0.045)
Age of household head -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Education of household head 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ratio of skilled over adult members 0.089 0.076 0.067 0.062
(0.090) (0.090) (0.085) (0.083)
Title on land 0.040 0.039 0.037 0.043
(0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Employment rate (district level) 0.003** 0.003** 0.003* 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Adults dummies Yes Yes Yes
Age of oldest members Yes Yes
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 547 547 547 547
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions include a constant, household
size by age categories (0-5, 6-14, 15-29, 30-49 and over 50) and indicators of access
to water and electricity. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level of significance
sion receipt produces a crowding out effect on remittances, the coefficient of the pension
eligibility variable would be downward biased. On the other hand, if the receipt of a
pension facilitates migration, financing job searching, two possible effects are expected.
If it does not result in an increase in remittances, then the omission of remittances from
the analysis should not bias the results. If, instead, remittances do increase, the effect on
technical efficiency is expected to be similar to that of the pension and can be interpreted
as an indirect liquidity effect of the latter. Migrants sending remittances are equally dis-
tributed across households, with 41% of them in households with an eligible member.
Therefore, the exclusion of remittances from the analysis, which are likely to be subject
to a measurement error, does not significantly affect the interpretation of the results.
In the regressions presented so far the share of off-farm income on total household
income has been considered an exogenous regressor. However, labour allocation decisions
can be simultaneous to household efficiency that can influence the selection into off-farm
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Table 2.7: Estimations dealing with the endogeneity of the income diversification index
IV OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Share off-farm income 0.004*
(0.002)
Household eligibility 0.151* 0.142* 0.096*
(0.078) (0.084) (0.056)
Gender of household head 0.027 0.118 0.070
(0.078) (0.085) (0.046)
Age of household head -0.004 -0.009** -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Education of household head 0.006 -0.009 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
Ratio of skilled members -0.077 -0.033 0.041
(0.139) (0.167) (0.093)
Title on land 0.066 0.093 0.049
(0.053) (0.063) (0.037)
Employment rate (district level) 0.004* 0.004* 0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Second quartile 0.016
(0.045)
Third quantile 0.08*
(0.044)
Fourth quantile 0.182***
(0.048)
Adults dummies Yes Yes Yes
Age of oldest members Yes Yes Yes
District dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 193 235 547
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions include a
constant, household size by age categories (0-5, 6-14, 15-29, 30-49 and
over 50) and indicators of access to water and electricity. *, ** and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance.
activities. Moreover, because off-farm income is also used to compute household tech-
nical efficiency estimates, a potential measurement error in reporting off-farm earnings
could lead to a spurious correlation between the two variables. I deal with this potential
endogeneity problem using instrumental variable technique. Specifically I exploit the in-
formation on the share of off-farm income in 1998 for those households observed in both
waves of the KIDS survey. Using this instrument, the sample size notably reduces. The
results are reported in the first column of table 2.7 and confirm the previous results. How-
ever, the potential presence of serial correlation in the error term challenges the validity of
this instrument. Although statistically valid and relevant, past participation in off-farm
activities can, for example, be correlated with current managerial skills and still leave the
problem unresolved. Unfortunately, no better instruments are available. When households
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participating in off-farm activities are excluded from the analysis, the positive liquidity
effect of the pension receipt is still evident, confirming that the potential endogeneity of
the income diversification indicator has not affected the other results (table 2.7, second
column). Because of self selection issues, however, these latter results are not used for
further inference.
Table 2.8: Additional robustness checks
(1) (2) (3)
Share off-farm income 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household eligibility 0.117*
(0.060)
Gender of household head 0.084* -0.002 0.034
(0.047) (0.032) (0.039)
Age of household head -0.004 -0.001 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Education of household head 0.001 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ratio of skilled members 0.06 0.079 0.076
(0.093) (0.090) (0.090)
Title on land 0.053 0.041 0.005
(0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
Employment rate (district level) 0.003* 0.003** 0.003**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Person above eligibility 0.084*
(0.045)
Person below eligibility 0.018
(0.045)
Woman age 45-50 0.120**
(0.054)
Woman age 50-55 0.087
(0.063)
Woman age 55-60 0.047
(0.064)
Woman age 60-65 0.130*
(0.076)
Woman age 65-70 0.120*
(0.068)
Woman age 70 and over 0.133**
(0.072)
Adults dummies Yes
Age of oldest members Yes
District dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 494 547 547
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions include a
constant, household size by age categories (0-5, 6-14, 15-29, 30-49 and
over 50) and indicators of access to water and electricity. *, ** and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance.
Finally, in the last column of table 2.7, the share of off-farm income does not enter
directly in the regression. Instead dummy variables indicating which quartile, in terms of
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the distribution of the shares, the household belongs to are included. The results show
that when the share of off-farm income is above 35%, non-farming earnings have a positive
effect on household technical efficiency. Moving from zero off-farm income to earning at
least 35% of total income from off farm activities has a significant impact on household
efficiency comparable to that of having a pension beneficiary in the household.
Additional checks have been made to further address the concerns about the dis-
crepancy between pension take-up and eligibility. One of the reasons explaining these
divergences lies in the potential misreporting of age. It is possible that interviewees report
their age, or the age of their family members in rounded decades. If this is the case, it
could be particularly problematic since pension eligibility for women starts at age 60. To
analyse the influence of a potential measurement error on previous results I run the above
sets of regressions excluding those households with women aged 60. The results are repor-
ted in the first column of table 2.8 and confirm previous findings. The coefficient of the
pension eligibility variable is higher, indicating that the effect of the pension on household
technical efficiency could have been underestimated due to a measurement error in the
reported age of the women in the household.
To provide additional support to previous results, the age-discontinuity in the pension
program structure is recalled to further address the issues of possible confounding effects
between pension receipt and age trends. In column 2, the effects of the presence of a
household member close to the age of eligibility, namely a man aged between 50 and 64 or
a woman aged between 50 and 59, is compared to the effect of having an eligible man aged
between 65 and 75 and a woman aged between 60 and 75 in the household. The results
show a significant impact of those age groups above the eligibility age, while no effect
is found for the presence of adult members below eligibility. Finally, dummy variables
indicating the presence of a woman in different age groups - 45-50, 50-55, 55-60, 60-65,
65-70 and over 70 - are included in the regressions. The presence of elderly men in the
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household is not considered since there are very few male pension beneficiaries. The results
show that the effect of an adult woman in the household decreases with her age. However
a sharp increase in the size of the coefficient is observed for the 60-65 age group and for
the others above the age of eligibility. This non-linearity in the age of the woman cannot
be explained by an age effect and is, instead, in line with the fact that a woman becomes
eligible at age 60.
2.7 Conclusions
The estimation of household technical efficiency, using a sample of 547 farm households
in the KwaZulu Natal Province, has revealed the presence of large inefficiencies. The ana-
lysis has been conducted at household-level and off-farm activities have been considered
as additional outputs of production. This is motivated by the presence of market imper-
fections and technical interdependencies between farm and off-farm activities. Household
strategies to deal with market imperfections, such as the lack of credit and the presence
of transaction costs, are captured in the household-level analysis and contribute to a more
comprehensive estimation of technical efficiency. Income diversification is found to increase
household technical efficiency. Although it is not possible to establish a prevailing explan-
ation, this can partly be attributed to a liquidity effect. The positive effect of the receipt
of a pension from the OAP, in fact, confirms the presence of a binding liquidity constraint.
Access to liquidity enables farmers to undertake efficiency enhancement investments and
overcome entry barriers to the labour market. These results suggest that institutional
reforms to improve the access to the labour and credit markets in the KwaZulu Natal
Province could allow a more efficient use of farm household resources.
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Chapter 3
Analysing the welfare-improving
potential of land in the former
homelands of South Africa
3.1 Introduction
South Africa has a large rural population mostly residing in the former homelands. Stat-
istical records reveal that in 1997 about 12.7 million households, that is 31% of the total
population, were living in rural areas in the former homelands. Despite the large share of
the rural population, 86% of arable land was controlled by large commercial farms while
50% of landed African households had access to less than 1 hectare of land. Although
off-farm activities and government transfers are very important sources of income for the
rural economy, land-based activities can highly contribute to the overall well-being of rural
population by providing a return to family uneducated labour (Carter and May, 1999) and
goods and services for home consumption. This argument gains more importance when
placed in a broader economic context. According to Lipton and Lipton (1993), South
Africa’s large endowment of labour suggests the need for more labour-intensive agricul-
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tural production that requires a movement toward small scale labour-intensive farming.
Eswaran and Kotwal (1986), in fact, show that the utility of landless households is also in-
creased when the distribution of land is moved from a highly unequal setting, with few very
large farms, to a scenario characterised by a more egalitarian distribution of smallholders.
Although the effects of land holding extend beyond those on the direct beneficiaries, the
analysis proposed here is limited to the relationship between land endowments and house-
hold welfare in the rural former homelands. An asset index is used to measure household
welfare using two different datasets collecting information on rural farm households. The
choice of the indicator is driven mainly by the availability of the data. Nevertheless, the
asset index has some advantages over other measures of welfare, which will be explained
during the analysis. Moreover, the asset index, constructed using principal component
analysis (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001), leads to a welfare distribution that is coherent with
that obtained using alternative measures such as income and consumption per capita.
The economic theory of the farm household provides support to a positive relationship
between land and household welfare. However, little empirical evidence is available mainly
due to the difficulties in identifying the causal relationship between land and a measure
of household welfare. This paper investigates the relationship between land endowments
and household welfare exploiting historical data on migration to the former homelands.
The identification strategy relies on the fact that, since the introduction of the Native
Land Act in 1913, African households have been forcibly relocated to the homelands. The
year of arrival in the current location is used as instrument for land endowments since
later incomers were less likely to have access to land and to larger plots of land given the
increasing population pressure in these areas.
Results show the positive effect of land access on household welfare. Land size is also
positively related to household welfare so that an increase of 1 hectare is expected to
lift the household into a higher decile of the welfare distribution. A set of alternative
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specifications control for the presence of confounding effects produced by the potential
correlation between the year of arrival and the location of the household, the displacement
costs occurring in the early years after arrival and the quality of the land. Further checks
ensure that the results are robust to the choice of the welfare indicator and of the historical
sub-periods characterising the process of segregation of the African population since 1913.
The impossibility of distinguishing between voluntary and forced movements, in particular
within the homelands where the first are more likely to occur, however challenges the
validity of the instrument. This issue is partially addressed with the support of information
on the district of previous residence contained in one of the survey adopted and in the
1996 population census.
This paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 provides an overview of the existing literature
investigating the relationship between land endowments and household welfare from both
a theoretical and empirical perspective. This is followed by the description of the two
datasets used in the analysis and a discussion of the main characteristics of the households
in the sample. Section 4 introduces the historical setting underlying the identification
strategy proposed in this paper with a focus on the main events and aspects characterising
the massive forced removals of the African population conducted during the apartheid
legacy. Section 5 outlines the empirical strategy adopted and section 6 and 7 discuss the
results. Finally section 8 concludes.
3.2 Land and household welfare: theory and existing em-
pirical evidence
Several authors have highlighted the importance of land in contributing to the livelihoods
of the rural South African population in both financial and social terms. Most households,
for example, derive a direct use value from land-based activities from the provision of
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goods and services associated with livestock, foods harvested and natural resources for
home consumption and for exchange with other goods and services.
The theoretical framework underlying the economic theory on land and household
welfare is mainly based on the standard microeconomic theory of the farm household
developed by Singh et al. (1986). The household farm is considered a unitary decision unit
in which both the consumption and the production side are taken into account. The focus
on the household rather than the farm unit is particularly relevant in the presence of market
imperfections since consumption and production decisions are jointly determined. Eswaran
and Kotwal (1986) and Finan et al. (2005), for example, use a farm household model with
imperfect credit and labour market conditions and where access to credit increases with
land size. This is based on the argument that larger farms have better access to credit
through the collateral use of land. Eswaran and Kotwal (1986), show how household labour
allocation decisions are determined by land endowments and that a transfer of working
capital, including land, from larger to smaller farm households can be welfare and output
improving. Finan et al. (2005) show how household income is positively affected by land
endowments through a direct effect (the income generated by the increased production)
and an indirect effect when labour and credit markets are imperfect. The magnitude of the
overall effect varies across households, in particular, depending on whether the increased
demand for inputs is matched by an increased availability of credit due to use of additional
land as collateral. In the same vein, Burgess (2001) uses a theoretical household model
where land generates a twofold effect on household welfare. Considering imperfections in
land and food markets, the author shows that land has the potential to increase household
consumption through an income effect, due to increased production, and by providing a
cheaper source of food to the household.
Although the economic theory of the farm household gives support to the positive re-
lationship between land and household welfare, with heterogeneous features across house-
77
holds, there is little empirical evidence mainly due to the difficulties in identifying the
causal relationship between land and a measure of household welfare. Finan et al. (2005)
analyse the impact of land on household welfare, measured using an asset index, using
data on Mexican rural households for the period 1997-1998. They propose a linear and
a non-parametric specification to capture the non-linearities in the relationship between
land and household welfare. Although the study provides an extensive and rigorous ana-
lysis of the heterogeneous correlation between land and welfare across households, little
attention is paid to the identification of the causal relation between the two. The authors
find that land has a very high marginal welfare value for small farms (less than 1 hec-
tare), and that this effect decreases with land size. Burgess (2001), using data on Chinese
households, investigates the relationship between land size and household welfare meas-
ured by food consumption expenditure and calories intake. Considering a standard food
demand equation, once per capita income has been controlled for, the additional effect of
land per capita is to be attributed to its role in providing cheaper food to the household.
The effect of land is identified by the fact that land in China is distributed on the basis
of household nutritional needs, and therefore of household composition, that is beyond
households’ discretion given the strict family planning policies.
The majority of papers look at the impact of land transfers obtained through the
implementation of land reforms. Besley and Burgess (2000), for example, using a panel
dataset on sixteen Indian states for the period 1958-92 found that post-independence land
reforms positively contributed to poverty reduction. The potential endogeneity of the
land reform variable is addressed by using the composition of past political legislatures
as instruments for land reform transfers. Other papers are particularly relevant for the
present study given their focus on South Africa land reforms implemented since 1997.
Keswell et al. (2010) exploit the quasi-experimental setting of the Land Redistribution and
Agricultural Development (LRAD) program, introduced in 2001, and find a positive effect
78
on household consumption for the beneficiaries. The impact is identified by comparing
households still in the process of being granted the land transfer and households that have
already received it. A previous paper by Valente (2009) looks at the impact of LRAD
program on household food security. The results show that the land reform has not been
successful in reducing the food insecurity of the beneficiaries. This is mainly attributed
to the high displacement costs, since in most cases the assigned land is located far from
household’s current location, and the lack of organisation. The author uses alternative
techniques to deal with observed and unobserved variable biases, although no suitable
instruments were available to fully address the endogeneity of the land reform variable.
The existing empirical literature confirms the difficulties in identifying the causal rela-
tionship between land and household welfare given the non-random allocation of land and
the lack of suitable instruments. In this paper, I will attempt to address this empirical
issue by exploiting historical data on household migration to the homelands.
3.3 Data
The data used in this analysis are drawn from two different datasets: the KwaZulu-Natal
Development Indicators Household survey (KZN-DIHS) of 1996 and the Rural Survey of
1997. These datasets are the only available datasets that provide information on both
land and migration history. I opted for the use of two surveys mainly because neither
of them provides exhaustive information for the purpose of this analysis. The Rural
Survey 1997 provides data on the amount of land available to the household, the initial
focus of this analysis, and detailed information on farming activities. However, it does
not provide information on location (distance to the nearest town) and on the previous
district of residence, although it does report the year of arrival. This latter information, in
particular, is useful to narrow the focus of the analysis to provide further support for the
use of the estimation strategy adopted in this study, as will be explained in the following
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sections. The KZN-DIHS 1996, instead, provides more detailed information on migration
to the homeland but is confined to a much smaller sample and provides information only
on whether the household has access to land with relatively less information on farming
activities. The use of both surveys, therefore, allows me to conduct some exercises to
support the instrumental variable strategy adopted in this study. However, because the
information on land provided by the two surveys is now of two types, a binary variable
indicating access to land and a continuous variable indicating the amount of land available,
the analysis is conducted separately for each dataset and is described is section 3.6.1 and
3.6.2.
The KZN-DIHS has been conducted by the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government
and Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). The complete survey covers 6500 house-
holds across the province of KwaZulu-Natal, which incorporates the former homeland of
KwaZulu. The sample size has been reduced to consider only the households living in
rural areas. This cross section survey has been used mainly because it provides inform-
ation on both the year of arrival and the previous district of residence, which makes it
possible to establish whether a household has moved from a non-homeland area. However,
it does not provide information on the amount of land owned by the household and only
reports whether the household has access to land for agricultural purposes. The survey
provides detailed information on household living conditions and asset ownership that are
useful for the construction of a welfare index. It also provides information on household
consumption that will be used in one of the empirical specifications proposed below.
The analysis of the impact of land size on household welfare uses the Rural Survey 1997
conducted by Statistics South Africa, which collected information on 6,000 rural house-
holds located in the 10 former homeland territories. This cross-section survey provides
information on the hectares available to each household for farming purposes, although
less detailed information is available as far as asset holding, income or consumption are
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concerned. Another drawback of this survey is the lack of information on the previous dis-
trict of residence, as previously mentioned, so that it is not possible to distinguish between
movements to and within the homelands.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest
(1) KZN-DIHS 1996 (2) Rural Survey 1997
Mean (sd) Mean (sd)
Land (dummy) 0.38 0.65
(0.49) (0.47)
Hectares of land (landed households) 1.41
(3.57)
Education household head (dummy) 4.07 4.66
(3.37) (4.63)
Age of household head 49.25 56.25
(14.23) (16.22)
Gender of household head (dummy) 0.75 0.51
(0.43) (0.50)
Pension eligible members (dummy) 0.28 0.42
(0.45) (0.49)
Children 1.61 2.97
(1.49) (2.01)
Number of skilled members 0.80 1.08
(1.15) (1.22)
Number of unskilled members 2.20 2.00
(1.45) (1.31)
Average eduction of adult members 5.21 6.58
(3.16) (3.49)
Author’s calculation using the KZN-DIHS and the Rural Survey.
The summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis and reported in
table 3.1 offer a general picture of the main characteristics of the households that are the
focus of this study. According to the KZN-DIHS, 38% of the households living in rural
areas in the KwaZulu Natal province have access to land. Among rural households residing
in the former homelands, 65% of those interviewed by the Rural Survey have access to a
plot of land. Plots are in general small with an average size of 1.41 hectares, so that as
a consequence, only 10% of them produce farm products for sale while the majority work
the land to provide food for home consumption. The average household size is between 4
and 5 members. Adult members have on average 5 to 6 years of education, less than the
9 years of compulsory education introduced in 1996.
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3.4 Historical background
Segregation in South Africa started to take shape with the introduction of the Natives
Land Act in 1913 stating that black Africans were no longer to be able to own or rent
land outside designated reserves. During the apartheid era, which officially started in
1948, the reserves were converted to bantustans or homelands and later some of them into
‘independent’ states within South Africa. The population was classified into four racial
groups (‘black, ‘white, ‘coloured, and ‘Indian). From 1958, the black population was de-
prived of its citizenship, legally becoming citizens of one of ten tribally based self-governing
homelands: Lebowa, QwaQwa, Bophuthatswana, KwaZulu, KaNgwane, Transkei, Ciskei,
Gazankulu, Venda and KwaNdebele. African people were only temporary resident in the
remaining territories for as long as they offered their labour there.
Residential areas were segregated, often by means of forced removals. According to
Desmond (1971), the governments object was to return 5% of the African population from
the white areas to the homelands every year. Several laws regulated the movements of the
African population. The Pass law, introduced in 1923, stipulated that the black population
should carry pass books when outside the designated homelands. Several influx controls
were introduced to limit the number of African people allowed to live and work in white
areas (Platzky and Walker, 1985).
People were relocated from ‘white farms, from ‘black spots’ (area of black settlement
surrounded mainly by ‘white farmers), from small town locations and from metropolitan
areas. Removals were initially conducted by direct intervention of government authorities
also through arbitrary searches and checks. Later, after 1980, the public emphasis was
on people moving ‘voluntarily. Removals were, however, the results of indirect coercion
by the authorities and the security police through intimidations and threats of arrest and
detention (Platzky and Walker (1985), pp 152-76). In many townships and rural areas, for
example, new construction was frozen; hospitals, schools and other public facilities for the
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black population were relocated to the homelands. This was a deliberate tactic to enforce
voluntary removal to the homelands (Murray, 1987).
There are no official records of removals and often statistical data were deliberately
hidden. However, according to Platzky and Walker (1985), the process of forced removals
affected some 3.5 million people in the period 1960-1982 excluding those households for-
cibly removed within the homelands due to the implementation of the betterment plans
described below. Desmond (1971) provides the first attempt to document forced relo-
cations, his narrative description of removals is the results of months spent travelling
throughout the country. Simkins (1983) provides some quantitative estimates of popula-
tion changes and movements for the year 1950, 1960, 1970 and 1980 and estimates a net
inflow to the homelands of about a million people in the decade 1960-1970 that had its
counterpart outflow mostly in the rural areas outside the homelands.
Figure 3.1: Distribution of arrivals in the homelands
Figure 3.1 plots the frequency of arrivals in the current location for households living in
the homelands using information from the two household surveys. While it shows that the
date of arrival is not always accurately reported, given the high frequency of rounded dec-
ades (this issues will be addressed later in the empirical analysis), it shows an acceleration
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of movements in the early 1990s. This is in line with the fact that evictions accelerated in
this period partly in response to commercial farmers’ concerns about legislation intended
to improve the security and working conditions of their workers (Lyne and Darroch, 2004).
The process of forced relocations also continued within the homeland territories. Ac-
cording to Freund (1984) the initially scattered structure of the homelands, appearing as
demarcated islands within South Africa, required a consolidation program that produced
another massive wave of removals. Even after this process, because the population within
the homelands was of heterogenous ethnic background, an additional reshuﬄing of people
was conducted. Moreover, a series of ‘betterment plans’ were implemented from the 1930s
onwards to control land usage, which are considered to have produced the numerically
largest and most widespread form of resettlement in South Africa. de Wet (1994) argues
that if within-homeland relocations are considered, at least seven million African have been
resettled for political purposes since 1913. Under this program, designated areas were di-
vided into distinct land use zones: residential, arable and grazing areas. Land regarded as
unsuitable for cultivation was removed from use, so that in some areas people were left with
less arable land than they had before or they lost their arable land altogether (de Wet,
1987). Finally, households were also removed for strategic and infrastructural reasons,
for example to make space for dam projects (Woodstock and Upper Tugela) or for the
clearance of South African borders (Freund, 1984). Finally, it is worth noting that forced
removals ”did not follow a pre-determined and predictable blueprint. Potential victims
could not entirely count on the next move of the state” (Freund, 1984) since government
removals plans often appeared in contradictory forms in different official publications.
3.4.1 Forced removals and access to land
The relationship between removals and access to land is to be found in the increasing
population density in the former homelands. The total population density for South
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Africa almost doubled between 1970 and 1995, from almost 19 people per square km in
1970 to 34 people per square km. The situation was more dramatic in the homeland areas
that constitute less than 14% of African territory and hosts a large share of South African
population. According to Simkins (1983), while 39% (of a total ‘black’ population of 11
million) were living in the homelands in 1950, 53% (of 21 million) were in the homelands
in 1980. The forced removals and settlement planning were major contributors to the
overcrowding in the homelands. In the Qwaqwa homeland in 1983, for example, after a
period of massive relocation of people, its population density was estimated to be over
1,000 people per square km, from a population of 24,000 in 1970 to a population of 400,000
in 1983 (de Wet, 1994).
The increased population density in the homeland areas inevitably led to increasing
pressure on the available land for farming and residential purposes so that those arriving
later in the homelands were less likely to have access to land and particularly to larger
plots of land. Using data from the Rural Survey 1997 it is possible to see these patterns
in land endowments. Figure 3.2 shows the negative relationship between both land access
and size and the date of arrival in the current location. This negative correlation is at the
basis of the identification strategy adopted in this study.
The two surveys were conducted in 1996 and 1997, two and three years, respectively,
after the end of the apartheid. Although land distribution has been a major concern
since 1995, the first period was mainly characterised by policymaking, consultation and
the building of institutions for the delivery of a land reform. Government strategies for
reconstruction and development became part of South Africa’s Constitution later in 1996
and the final policy framework, the White Paper on South African Land Policy, was
implemented in 1997. The available data on land from the two surveys used in this study,
are therefore most likely to be unaffected by post-apartheid land reforms. This constitutes
an advantage for this analysis since before the implementation of the land reforms, land
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Figure 3.2: Percentage of household holding land and land size by year of arrival
endowments can be better predicted using historical information on migration to the
homelands.
In general, movements to the homelands after 1913 can be attributed to forced re-
movals through coercive actions, intimidation and pressure by the public authorities and
security police. Case studies discussed in Platzky and Walker (1985), the narrative evid-
ence reported in Desmond (1971) and other anecdotal evidence, in fact, suggest that no
households would voluntarily move to the overcrowded and unpleasant homelands. The
homeland of residence is also determined by the government according to the language
spoken or the ethnic group to which the people apparently belong (Platzky and Walker,
1985), and it is, therefore, excluded from household decision-making. An important dis-
tinction need to be made between the timing of relocations and the fact of being removed.
The empirical analysis proposed in this chapter considers only those households that re-
port to have moved to the current location during the period 1913-94, therefore, although
the results may not be generalised to the entire population of the homelands they are
not driven by systematic differences between original inhabitants and new incomers. As
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far as the timing of relocations is concerned, a specific time pattern cannot be identified
since relocations from white rural areas overlapped with removals from urban areas, black
spots, sites allocated to strategic infrastructures and for ‘betterment planning’. Therefore,
the year of arrival in the homelands cannot be associated to specific causes or conditions.
Moreover, because unobservable characteristics were also likely to be unknown to the au-
thorities that enforced the relocations they are likely to be uncorrelated with the timing of
arrivals. These circumstances provide a useful setting to analyse the relationship between
land and household welfare exploiting the exogeneity of the year of arrival in the homeland
to households’ welfare-generating ability and its correlation with land access and size.
3.5 Measuring household welfare using principal component
analysis
Household welfare is measured using an asset index. This approach is used mainly to
construct a similar measure of welfare across the two surveys, although employing different
type of assets, since information on consumption or income is not available in the Rural
Survey 1997. Although the choice has been mainly driven by the availability of data,
this approach has some advantages. An asset index captures aspects of household welfare
that are usually neglected using monetary measures, for example access to basic services
such as water and electricity. Moreover, because ownership of assets is easily verified it
is expected to be more accurate than consumption expenditure data, for example, which
are usually recorded using retrospective recall of information. Given the data available a
possible alternative approach would have been the use of the number of assets owned by
the households. However this approach give equal weights to all assets and does not taken
into account differences in quality. Alternatively, the asset position of the household could
also be measured using the value of the assets owned, however asset price are not available
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in the two surveys used in this study.
The asset index has been constructed using principal component analysis. This ap-
proach has been evaluated by Filmer and Pritchett (2001) who demonstrate its suitability
for measuring household welfare. Because ownership of different assets is highly correlated
across households it is advantageous to collapse information on specific asset ownership
into a single new variable (McKenzie, 2005). This artificial variable, W1, is obtained as the
weighted sum of a set of correlated variables, in this specific case variables indicating asset
ownership. Given the vector of asset indicators (x1, ...xN ) where each vector xn contains
observations on each of the N assets for the H household in the sample, the asset index
is represented by the following linear combination:
W1 = f1
(x1 − x1
s1
)
+ ...+ fN
(xn − xN
sN
)
, n = 1...N, (3.1)
where, xn and sn are the mean and standard deviation of each asset over all households,
therefore, the variables are standardised to have zero mean and unit variance. Weights,
fn, are chosen so that this linear combination has the greatest sample variation. In doing
so it maximises the heterogeneity across households so that assets which all or none of the
households hold receive small weights, since they do not explain the variation in welfare
across households. In practise, this is done by computing the eigenvectors and eigenvalues
of the covariance matrix of the standardised x, that is the correlation matrix of the x,
defined as C. This can be seen from the maximisation, here reported in matrix form, of the
variance of the vector W1 given a normalisation constraint, f ′f = 1 where f = (f1...fn)′.
The Lagrangean of this maximisation problem is reported below:
L = f ′Cf − λ(f ′f − 1), (3.2)
where λ is the Lagrangean multiplier associated with the normalisation constraint. The
88
variance of W1 is, in fact, given by:
N∑
n,m=1
fnfmCm,n = f ′Cf. (3.3)
By differentiating equation 3.2 we obtain the following first order conditions:
Cf − λf = 0, → (C − λI)f = 0, (3.4)
Solving the first order conditions is equivalent to finding the eigenvector, f , of the correl-
ation matrix C and the corresponding eigenvalues, λ. The linear combination computed
using the eigenvector so obtained is called the first principal component, W1. Principal
component analysis also computes the subsequent N−1 components, and the correspond-
ing eigenvectors and eigenvalues, that account for the remaining variance in the sample.
They are obtained by solving N − 1 similar maximisation problems where the variance of
alternative linear combinations is maximised subject to the constraint that each combin-
ation is orthogonal to the previous, that is: Cov(Wn,Wm) = 0 with n < m. Commonly,
only the first component is retained and is used in this analysis as a measure of household
welfare.
Table 3.2: Scoring factors and summary statistics
(1) KZN-DIHS 1996 (2) Rural Survey 1997
Score f Mean Sd Score f Mean Sd
Electricity (dummy) 0.27 0.37 0.48 0.22 0.26 0.44
Near water (dummy) 0.14 0.67 0.47 0.04 0.36 0.48
Flush toilet (dummy) 0.34 0.16 0.37 0.03 0.01 0.08
Pit latrine (dummy) -0.27 0.75 0.43 0.46 0.71 0.45
Other toilet (dummy) -0.02 0.09 0.29 -0.47 0.28 0.45
Brick structure (dummy) 0.31 0.19 0.39 0.45 0.47 0.50
Traditional house (dummy) -0.28 0.66 0.47 -0.46 0.50 0.50
Rooms per person 0.14 0.63 0.38 0.22 0.93 0.71
Number of rooms 0.02 2.45 1.23 0.24 4.75 2.52
Own washing machine 0.29 0.23 0.42
Own washing machine 0.33 0.05 0.23
Own vacuum cleaner 0.33 0.05 0.23
Own microwave 0.35 0.07 0.26
Own car 0.31 0.13 0.33
The percentage of the covariance explained by the first principal component is
33% in (1) and 29% in (2).
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In this analysis, the vector of asset indicators contains dummy variables for the own-
ership of specific assets (fridge, washing-machine, vacuum cleaner, microwave and car),
not available in the Rural Survey 1997, characteristics of the house (brick structure, tra-
ditional, type of toilet) and access to utilities (electricity and water), and some numerical
variables such as the number of rooms in the house (table 3.2).
The first principal component explains 33% and 29% of the total variance in the data
for the Kwazulu-Natal and Rural Survey respectively. For dummy variables the scores
reported in table 3.2 can be easily interpreted. A movement from 0 to 1 in one of the
asset indicator changes the index by the score divided by the standard deviation. A
positive score indicates that the ownership of the asset leads to a higher welfare index.
For example, a household owning a fridge has an asset index that is by 0.69 higher than
that of a household without a fridge. This is in line with low quality assets being attributed
a negative score, as in the case of the traditional-type houses and toilets of different types
not connected to the sewer system.
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of the asset index by food consumption and income per
capita
KZN-DIHS 1996 Rural Survey 1997
Consumption pc Welfare index Income pc Welfare index
Quartile Mean (sd) Quartile Mean (sd)
1 -0.839 1 -0.393
(1.092) (1.697)
2 -0.719 2 -0.030
(1.176) (1.689)
3 -0.241 3 0.011
(1.645) (1.670)
4 2.475 4 0.451
(3.492) (1.693)
Regarding the Rural Survey 1997, although the approach uses a reasonable range of
assets, the absence of information on household non-agricultural assets such as television,
car etc. could lead to an incomplete representation of household living standards. Never-
theless, the asset index constructed using the Rural Survey seems to perform well when
compared to an income based measure of welfare. This is reported in the second column of
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table 3.3 that shows how higher values of the asset index are associated with higher income
per capita. Because information on income is provided only by categories, a better check
would be against household expenditure, as it is done for the KZN-DIHS. Nevertheless,
the comparison still adds some confidence in the use of this asset index as a measure of
household welfare.
3.6 Empirical specification
This section outlines the empirical procedure for the estimation of the relationship between
land endowments and household welfare. The base empirical specification is the following:
wi = α+ βAi + θXi + i, (3.5)
where wi represents the asset index estimated using principal component analysis and Xi
is a set of household and district level characteristics that are expected to affect household
welfare. These variables include the characteristics of the household head: gender, age
and education. The latter two variables, together with variables indicating the highest
level of education in the household and the number of skilled members, are expected
to capture the human capital contribution to household welfare. Because the pension
transfer received from the Old Age Pension Program (OAP) is quite generous for African
household and could bias the results if omitted, I also control for the presence of pension
eligible members to avoid the potential endogeneity of actual pension take-up. This is
done accordingly to the age eligibility criteria of the pension program by including a
dummy variable taking the value of one when there is a woman over age 60 and a man
over age 65 in the household. Additional controls include the number of children in
different age categories, the number of unskilled members and magisterial district level
characteristics such as population density, the employment rate and the share of household
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with access to telephone to measure the level of development of local infrastructures.
Further variables are added to address specific empirical issues and will be discussed
in the next section. The variable Ai captures land endowments and can be either a
dummy variable indicating whether the household has access to land (obtained from the
KZN-DHIS 1996) or a continuous variable representing the amount of land available to
the household (using the Rural Survey 1997). These two alternative specifications are
discussed below.
3.6.1 Dealing with an endogenous dummy variable
When analysing the impact of land access, the variable Ai indicates a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 when the household has access to land and is obtained from the
KZN-DHIS 1996. Given the binary nature of this variable, the average effect of land on
household welfare, conditional on other covariates, can be written as follows:
E[w1i|Xi, Ai = 1]− E[w0i|Xi, Ai = 1] = E[w1i − w0i|Xi, Ai = 1],
where w1i denotes the welfare of the household if it has access to land and w0i represents
household welfare otherwise. Because the second term on the left of this equation is not
observed, the above effect, usually defined as treatment effect on the treated, cannot be
estimated. Thus a comparison of outcomes between treated and untreated is necessary
and is reported below:
E[w1i|Xi, Ai = 1]− E[w0i|Xi, Ai = 0] = E[w1i − w0i|Xi, Ai = 1]
+ E[w0i|Xi, Ai = 1]− E[w0i|Xi, Ai = 0].
This effect involves a bias term E[w0i|Xi, Ai = 1] − E[w0i|Xi, Ai = 0] that differs from
zero when certain type of households are more likely to have access to land than others.
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This is the case, for example, if households that have experienced relatively unfavourable
circumstances in the labour market are more likely to access land. The bias disappears
when access to land is independent of household’s ability to generate welfare.
One possible option to correct this bias is the use of an instrument that is correlated
with the endogenous dummy variable and independent of household welfare potential,
conditionally on the other included covariates. The instrument used in this analysis is
the year of arrival in the homelands. As reported in section 3.4.1, removals conducted by
the government were mostly unpredictable and produced a massive movement of people
to the homelands. Given the increasing population density in the homelands following
the continuous inflows of relocated households, later incomers were less likely to be given
access to land (figure 3.2). This argument underlies the causal relationship between access
to land and year of arrival.
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics of household age structure by decade of arrival
KZN-DIHS 1996 Rural Survey 1997
Decade Household head Oldest member Household head Oldest member
1910 62.333 67.364
(17.947) (13.313)
1920 63.543 65.371
(12.312) (10.834)
1930 60.734 64.298
(11.673) (10.569)
1940 58.105 61.581
(13.460) (12.840)
1950 68.571 68.571 59.684 62.538
(11.013) (11.013) (16.102) (15.584)
1960 57.120 60.080 58.263 61.053
(11.805) (13.982) (15.283) (14.632)
1970 51.831 52.442 55.989 58.160
(12.557) (13.689) (14.309) (14.636)
1980 46.373 46.906 51.443 53.770
(12.257) (12.856) (15.342) (15.708)
1990 41.473 42.068 45.736 47.539
(13.313) (14.189) (15.523) (16.127)
Total 44.657 45.296 53.454 55.832
(13.629) (14.477) (15.892) (16.077)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
The independence assumption requires two conditions: that the instrument is exogen-
ous and that it does not affect welfare other than through its effect on land. First the year
of arrival in the homelands can be reasonably considered uncorrelated with unobservable
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household characteristics, since removals where enforced by official authorities with the
aim of segregating the entire black population. Moreover, because household unobserv-
able characteristics were also likely to be unknown to the authorities that enforced the
relocations they are likely to be uncorrelated with the pace and timing of the arrivals. In
addition, because forced removals were mostly unpredictable no pre-moving arrangements
could be undertaken. The date of arrival can, therefore, be considered independent of
households’ welfare potential. Second, the year of arrival seems not to affect household
welfare through other channels rather than access to land, once additional control vari-
ables, described below, are included. Table 3.4 reveals that households that have moved
more recently are in general younger than those that arrived earlier. Because the age struc-
ture of the household could itself affect welfare and could be captured by the instrument,
regressions include controls for the age of the household head and a polynomial of the age
of the oldest member of the household. In addition, the time of arrival could also have
affected the location in which the household resides, which could itself have an influence
on household welfare. This mechanism can be ruled out by controlling for household road
distance to the nearest town as reported in column 6 of table 3.5. An additional issue
arises if, for example, later incomers had access to fewer job and business opportunities
given the increasing population pressure in the homelands. Because this is likely to affect
the probability of finding a job, it could lead to a potential correlation between the year of
arrival and households’ unobservable ability to generate welfare. Unfortunately it is not
possible to control for household-specific employment opportunities. However, when plot-
ting the current average share of unemployed members per household by year of arrival,
using the KZN-DIHS data (figure 3.3), there does not seem to be a correlation between
the two, suggesting that later arrivals are not worse off in terms of job opportunities1.
1The larger variance for period 1950-70 is due to the lower number of observations.
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This can also be explained by the fact that most of the people arriving in the homelands
became cross-border commuters, living in the homelands and commuting daily to work
in ”white” areas (Murray, 1987). Additional controls for local population density and
employment rate should also capture the availability of job opportunities in the district of
residence. Additional controls are introduced to limit the presence of confounding effects
and are discussed in the next sections.
Figure 3.3: Average share of unemployed people in the households by year of arrival
(KwaZulu-Natal province, 1996)
Given the binary nature of the land variable, the first stage regression could be es-
timated using a nonlinear method such as logit or probit. Angrist (2001) argues that
the second-stage estimates will be inconsistent if the the first stage model is incorrectly
specified while a standard two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure can avoid this incon-
venience. The model is therefore estimated using 2SLS. It is worth noting that with a
dummy endogenous variable, instrumental variables procedures estimate causal effects for
those households whose behaviour is affected by the instrument. This is usually known
as local average treatment effect (LATE) (Angrist, 2001). That is, the effect is estimated
for those households that obtained land because they arrived early but would not have
received it if they arrived later, and for those households that did not receive land because
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they arrived late in the homelands, but would have obtained it if they had arrived earlier
(these two groups are known in the literature as compliers). This means that the results
are not informative about the effect on those households that would have never had access
to land, or those that would have accessed the land independently of their year of arrival.
Unfortunately, in practice, it is not possible to establish the size of this subpopulation of
compliers.
3.6.2 Dealing with a positive continuous endogenous variable
When analysing the impact of land size on household welfare, Ai is a positive continuous
variable indicating the amount of land available to the household that is obtained from the
Rural Survey 1997. The majority of the households surveyed received the land from the
local or tribal authority and about 82% do not possess title deeds. The absence of a land
market could lead to the conclusion that land should be considered as an exogenous vari-
able since households cannot easily adjust the amount according to their needs. However,
the presence of unobservable household characteristics that could be potentially correlated
with both land endowments and household welfare challenges the exogeneity of the land
variable. Unobserved land quality, social status, habits and attitude toward agriculture,
for example, are likely to be correlated with both household welfare and access to land.
To address this issue I use, also in this specification, the date of arrival in the current
location as an instrument for land endowments. Similarly to the argument used above,
given the increasing population pressure in the homelands, later incomers were more likely
to receive smaller plots of land. The correlation between land size and year of arrival can
be observed in the right panel of figure 3.2 where average land size by year of arrival is
plotted using data from the Rural Survey 1997. In line with the previous discussion on the
independence of the instrument, the year of arrival can be reasonably considered uncor-
related with unobservable household characteristics, since the timing of forced removals
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cannot be related to households’ habits, attitude toward agriculture or welfare-generating
ability. By controlling for the age of the household head and of the oldest members in the
household, as previously suggested, it is possible to isolate the effect of the instrument on
land from that on the age structure of the household. The year of arrival, however, could
also be negatively correlated with the quality of the land plot since better quality land
could have been assigned to earlier incomers. In this case the instrument would capture
both land size and quality inducing a bias in the estimates. Unfortunately, information
on specific plot quality is not available, but this issue is partially addressed by including
a proxy for land quality at district level, constructed using average maize production per
hectare. This specification is reported in table 3.6 column 4.
An additional channel through which the year of arrival could affect household welfare
is by capturing displacement costs. Specifically, households, in the first years after arrival,
may incur high transaction costs, such as search costs and resettlement costs, in the new
living area that could affect their ability to generate welfare. This issue is partially ruled
out, since I consider only households that arrived before the end of the apartheid, that
is only households that have resided in the current location for at least 3 years. This
applies also to the previous specification that deals with access to land. Further support is
provided by considering only households that had been living in the current location since
1990. This specification is reported in table 3.6 column 6. Finally, similarly to what has
been mentioned in the previous section, when using data from the Rural Survey 1997, the
year of arrival does not appear to be correlated with household employment conditions
(figure 3.4), suggesting that the instrument does not affect household welfare through
its correlation with the availability of local business and job opportunities. Additional
robustness checks are conducted and discussed in the next sections.
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Figure 3.4: Average share of unemployed people in the households by year of arrival
The model is estimated using 2SLS and the reduced form is the following:
wi = α+ βAˆi + θXi + i,
where Aˆi is obtained from a first-stage regression where the year of arrival in the current
location is used as an instrument. Although the censored nature of the land size variable
may suggest the use of a nonlinear first-stage regression, a conventional two-stage least
squares model is consistent independently of the non-linearity of the first stage (Angrist,
2001) and is therefore preferred because it gives consistent estimates under a broader set
of assumptions.
3.7 Estimation results: access to land and household welfare
in the KwaZulu-Natal province
This section reports and discusses the effects of having access to land on household welfare
in the KwaZulu-Natal province. The results have been obtained using an initial subsample
of 4,368 African rural households provided by the KZN-DIHS 1996 and are reported in
table 3.5. The subsample is further reduced once the instrument is used in the 2SLS
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procedure. The first column reports the results of the ordinary least squares estimation of
equation 3.5 and shows a positive correlation between land holding and the welfare level
of the household.
As discussed above, a potential endogeneity bias could be driving these results. The
other columns, therefore, report instrumental variable (IV) estimates. The instrument
for the land variable is the year of arrival in the current location in all the specifications.
Households that moved after 1994, i.e. after the end of the apartheid, are excluded from
the analysis. The households considered are, therefore, those that moved between 1948
and 1993 since no households reports a year of arrival earlier than 1948. Unfortunately,
when using this instrument the sample size is reduced noticeably to about 700 households.
The first-stage regressions are strong with an F statistic above 10 (reported at the bottom
of the table). In all IV specifications the first stage estimates show that the year of arrival
is negatively associated with access to land2. The first-stage regression associated with
column 2 is reported in table 10 in the appendix. Column 3 includes additional controls
for the age of the oldest members of the household. This is done to ensure that the
instrument is not capturing the effect of differences in the age structure of the household
and are included also in the subsequent specifications. All regressions include district
council dummies to control for differences in environmental and local conditions.
2Given the availability of only one instrument, it is not possible to test for overidentifying restrictions.
However, because any function of the instrument can potentially be a suitable instrument, using both the
year of arrival and its square as instruments the model is overidentified. The overidentification test statistic
reveals that the null hypothesis of joint validity cannot be rejected and add increases the confidence in
the instrument. However it is worth noting that the overidentification test relies on the assumption that
at least one instrument is valid. Therefore in this case, if this assumption does not hold for one of the
instruments it necessarily does not hold for the other. This reduces the power of the test. Because first-
stage regressions are better fitted with the year of arrival only, the results reported here consider only one
instrument.
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The coefficient of the land variable increases notably when land is instrumented with
the year of arrival and the Durbin-Wu Hausman test suggests that 2SLS results are to be
preferred to standard OLS. The downward bias of the OLS estimates could be explained
by the fact that if more disadvantaged households, in particular those facing unfavour-
able circumstances in the labour market, choose to engage in agricultural activities, and
therefore to access the land, the estimated effect of land on welfare would be small or
even negative, as suggested in Carter and May (1999). Therefore neglecting this source of
endogeneity would provide a more pessimistic view of the relationship between land and
welfare. The instrumental variable estimates reveal that the effect of access to land on
welfare is large. The increase in welfare of around 2.5 units is sufficient, on average, to
shift a household from the lowest to the top quintile of the distribution of welfare.
In the IV specifications discussed so far, about 70% of the households considered live in
a former homeland territory. Column 4 reports the results when only household living in
the former homelands are considered. The KwaZulu homeland comprises a large number of
non-contiguous parts spread throughout the KwaZulu-Natal province. The province cre-
ated in 1994 incorporates the former homeland of KwaZulu and the surrounding province
of Natal. Households in the sample are assigned to the former homeland on the basis of the
magisterial district of residence. The identification of the magisterial districts belonging
to the former homeland has been done using the information provided by Cox (2004) and
the map that overlaps the KwaZulu homeland borders with magisterial district boundaries
reported in Pauw (2005). The results reported in column 4 confirm previous findings. Al-
though the sample size is further reduced the instrument maintains its explanatory power.
This subsample, however, still considers both households that moved to and within the
homeland, and therefore it may include households that voluntary changed location within
the KwaZulu former homeland. This issue is expected to have a limited effect, since a
large fraction of within-homeland movements are expected to be the result of government
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‘betterment planning’. According to Platzky and Walker (1985), in fact, more than a
million people have been moved as a result of ‘betterment plans’ in KwaZulu from 1950 to
1985. To provide further support to the results, however, the estimates reported in column
5 are obtained by further restricting the sample to those households which migrated from
non-homeland areas given the lower probability of encountering voluntary migration in
this subsample. The coefficient of the land variable remains stable and significant and no
relevant changes are observed for the other explanatory variables.
Given the availability of consumption data in the KZN-DIHS survey, column 7 reports
the results of the same specification in column 6 where, however, the dependent variable
is food consumption per adult equivalent computed using the OECD equivalence scale3.
When using this alternative measure of household welfare, access to land is still found to
have a positive effect. This specification offers the opportunity to provide an economic
interpretation of the results. Obtaining access to land has a large effect on household
welfare by generating an increase in per-adult equivalent food consumption close to its
median value. Finally, the last column reports the results when the same specification is
applied to the Rural Survey 1997 dataset. Results appear to be in line with the findings
obtained using the KZN-DIHS although some issues related to the Rural Survey dataset
need to be further addressed as it is done in the following section.
Although the main focus of this analysis is the impact of access to land on household
welfare, some useful insights can be obtained by looking at the effects of the other cov-
ariates. Education plays an important role in contributing to household welfare. This is
shown by the positive and significant effect, throughout most of the specifications, of the
education level of the household head and of the highest educational attainment of the
household members. It is also reflected in the negative effect of the number of unskilled
3The OECD equivalence scale assigns a value of 1 to the first member of the household, 0.7 to each
additional adults and 0.5 to additional children in the household.
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members in the households that is also likely to capture the effect of the lack of labour
market opportunities for less educated household members.
3.8 Estimation results: land size and household welfare in
the former homelands
In this section I explore the relationship between land size and welfare using the subsample
of landed households provided by the Rural Survey 1997. I consider only households
with access to land since the aim of the analysis conducted in this section is to analyse
the welfare-improving effects of land size on households involved in land-based activities
excluding those that could be potentially engaged into completely different livelihood
strategies (Finan et al., 2005). In the first column of table 3.6, I report the estimates
of the ordinary least squares estimation of equation 3.5. The dependent variable is the
asset index constructed using data from the 1997 Rural Survey and summarised in the last
column of table 3.3. The results show a positive correlation between the amount of land
owned and household welfare. The remaining columns report the two-stage least squares
estimates and consider only households that moved to the current location during the
period 1913-1994. The first-stage regressions show the negative correlation between land
size and the year of arrival. The first-stage regression associated with column 2 is reported
in table 10 in the appendix. The F statistics reported at the bottom of the table confirms
the relevance of the instrument. The results using instrumental variable show that an
additional hectare of land, produces an increase of 0.610 in the welfare index, which is
sufficient, on average, to cause a shift to a higher decile of the welfare distribution.
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Column 3 reports the results when additional controls for the age structure of the
household are included, namely a polynomial of the age of the oldest man and woman in the
household. This is also included in the subsequent specifications. All regressions include
province dummies to control for differences in environmental and other local conditions.
In column 4 a variable capturing the variation in land quality across districts is included
and is intended to control for the potential correlation between the year of arrival and the
quality of the land, although it does not capture plot-specific quality. The results are in
line with previous findings and the coefficient of the land quality index is not significant.
This can be explained by the fact that the land in the former homelands is in general of
poor quality with little variation within the territory (Desmond, 1971).
Because the reasons for the move are unknown, one of the main concern is that forced
removals could be confounded with voluntary migration. Voluntary relocations were more
likely to occur within the homelands since, as previously mentioned, conditions in the
homelands were extremely unfavourable and the available descriptive evidence suggests
that no households would voluntary move to these overcrowded and unpleasant areas.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to establish whether the household moved to or within the
homeland of current residence since the 1997 Rural Survey does not provide information
on the previous place of residence. It is worth noting that massive forced relocations
were also implemented within the homeland territories, often motivated by ‘betterment
plans’ implemented since 1930. Therefore movements within the homelands are also likely
to be the result of coercive government policies although no direct evidence is available.
To further address this problem I use the 1996 South Africa population census which
provides information on the year of arrival in the current location and the district of
previous residence. Using this information it is possible to exclude from the analysis
those areas with the highest percentage of within-homeland movements and, therefore,
potentially with the highest probability of voluntary movements. Table 3.8 reports the
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distribution of movements by homelands and distinguishes between ”within-” and ”to-”
homeland migration. According to these figures, the two former homelands of Transkei and
Venda have the highest percentage of within-homeland movements, since 89% and 86%
of the households that arrived in the current location during the period 1913 - 1994 were
previously residing within the same homeland. In column 5 of table 3.6, households living
in these two homelands are excluded from the sample. The estimates reported confirm
previous findings although the F statistic of the first-stage regression is now lower due to
the reduced sample size. Similar results, reported in table 3.7, are also found when different
sub-periods are considered, in particular when households that moved before 1930, 1948
and 1958 are subsequently removed from the sample. These dates correspond to the main
events that affected the process of forced removals: ‘betterment plans’ were introduced in
1930, while apartheid officially started in 1948 and ‘black’ people were officially assigned
to a homeland territory in 1958.
Another potential problem may arise if forced removals have a direct welfare cost,
independent of land endowments. As previously mentioned, this issue is partially ruled
out by considering only households that arrived before the end of the apartheid, that is only
households that have resided in the current location for at least 3 years. A further exercise
is conducted by excluding from the sample those households that arrived in the current
location before 1990. Although post-arrival tangible and intangible displacement costs
can affect household performances and consequently household welfare, it is reasonable
to expect that after at least 7 years of residence in the same location the household
can overcome the initial difficulties. The results reported in column 6 confirm previous
findings. The coefficient of the land variable, although reduced in size is still positive
and significant. This confirms that the instrument is not capturing the effect of the
displacement costs associated with the length of the residence in the current location.
Because figure 3.1 reveals that households tend to report the year of arrival in rounded
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Table 3.7: Additional results on the effect of land size on household welfare
1930-1994 1948-1994 1958-1994 1913-1994
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Land (hectares) 0.609** 0.537** 0.492** 0.628**
(0.248) (0.235) (0.198) (0.259)
Education of household head 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.069*** 0.065***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Age of household head 0.009 0.017 0.020 0.005
(0.033) (0.031) (0.030) (0.034)
Gender of household head (dummy) -0.368 -0.385* -0.324 -0.375*
(0.227) (0.229) (0.204) (0.226)
Pension eligible members (dummy) -0.057 -0.049 -0.043 -0.057
(0.149) (0.145) (0.143) (0.147)
Children age 1-5 0.024 0.029 0.031 0.027
(0.055) (0.054) (0.052) (0.056)
Children age 6-17 0.005 -0.010 -0.012 -0.002
(0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
Number of unskilled members -0.044 -0.050 -0.049 -0.060
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041)
Number of skilled members 0.069 0.052 0.040 0.061
(0.056) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056)
Highest level of education 0.030 0.035 0.035 0.029
(0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.035)
Labor market dev index (district level) 1.741*** 1.721*** 1.621*** 1.744***
(0.432) (0.414) (0.369) (0.439)
Population density (district level) 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Land quality index 0.065 0.021 0.018 0.103
(0.126) (0.126) (0.118) (0.154)
Independence (dummy) -0.281
(0.307)
Observations 2649 2479 2328 2736
Kleibergen-Paap F statistics 10.872 9.576 10.975 10.829
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (p-value) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
All regressions include also the square of the age of the head of the household. Tests of
overidentifying restrictions performed using both the year of arrival and its square do not
reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid.
decades, I conduct a further exercise by dropping those households that could be poten-
tially misreporting the year of arrival, i.e. those households that arrived in 1920, 1930,
1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990. The instrument improves the ability to predict the
amount of land held by the household, so that the F statistic of the first stage is now above
16 and the results are again similar to previous findings. Finally, because those homelands
that obtained independence, namely Transkei in 1976, Bophuthatswana in 1977, Venda
in 1979 and Ciskei in 1981, were rewarded by the government with the building of roads,
shopping centres and hotels (Platzky and Walker (1985), p 23) I also run an additional
specification (reported in table 3.7) including a dummy variable indicating whether or not
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the homeland obtained independence and the results are almost unchanged.
Table 3.8: Movements of households in former homelands
Former homelands % moved within % moved from
the homeland area other areas
Kwazulu 56 44
Bophuthatswana 62 38
KaNgwane 34 66
KwaNdebele 19 81
Transkei 89 11
Ciskei 43 57
Venda 86 14
Ganzankulu 63 37
Lebowa 73 27
Qwaqwa 22 78
Source: author’s calculation from the South Africa Census 1996
In line with the results reported in the previous section, the education of the household
head positively affects household welfare. The number of unskilled members has a negative
effect, although not always significant, probably signalling the presence of constraints in
the labour market for less educated household members. The positive and significant effect
of the employment rate at district level indicates how the development of the local labour
market can positively influence household welfare. Finally, households with a male head
are worse off in comparison to female-headed households. This could be related to the fact
that, in rural areas, male heads usually tend to migrate to urban centres, and therefore
their presence in the household could signal a lack of off-farm sources of income.
Although the paper finds a positive relationship between land endowments and welfare,
it is not possible to identify how these effects are transmitted. The high share of households
producing mainly for home consumption suggests that land can benefit them by providing
a cheaper source of food. However, other mechanisms could be in action and cannot be
disentangled without further investigations.
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3.9 Conclusions
This paper explores the relationship between land endowments and household welfare.
Although economic theory supports a positive relationship between land and welfare,
little empirical evidence is available mainly due to the difficulties in identifying the causal
relationship between land and a measure of household welfare. The potential endogeneity
of the land variable is here addressed using historical data on migration to the former
homelands. The availability of data on the year of arrival in the current location reveals a
negative correlation between land endowment and arrival date that is in line with records
on increasing population pressure, and therefore with increasing scarcity of land, in these
areas since the introduction of the Native Land Act in 1913. The year of arrival is expected
to be independent of households’ unobserved ability to generate welfare. Movements to
the homelands, in fact, can be attributed to the massive forced removals conducted by
the central government with the aim of segregating the African population into different
homelands according to their ethnic background. Movements within the homelands can
also be largely explained by government ‘betterment planning’ for the reorganisation of
the territory in the homelands.
The empirical specification adopted in this paper assumes a linear relationship between
land size and household welfare that fails to capture the potential non-linear effects of
land endowments. Finan et al. (2005), for example, argue that credit and labour market
imperfections can affect the ability of the household to maintain production intensity
when land area increases. Therefore the relationship between land and household welfare
seems to follow a more complex pattern. Non-linear analyses, however, often require
non-parametric techniques or non-linear specifications where the presence of potential
endogenous explanatory variables requires the use of less conventional and more complex
solutions, when possible. Nevertheless the relevance of such heterogenous effects leaves
room for further investigations on the relationship between land and welfare across different
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dimensions of the farm household.
Results show the positive effect of land access on household welfare. Land size is also
positively related to household welfare so that an increase of 1 hectare is expected to
lift the household into a higher decile of the welfare distribution. A set of alternative
specifications control for the presence of confounding effects produced by the potential
correlation between the year of arrival and the location of the household, the displacement
costs occurring in the early years after arrival and the quality of the land. Results are
also robust to alternative specifications. The positive relationship here identified cannot,
however, be attributed to one or more transmission mechanisms and again leaves room for
further investigations. Nevertheless, these results suggest that reforms aimed at improving
access to land, a major concern of post-apartheid governments, have the potential of
improving household welfare. Moreover, because the households considered in this analysis
are living in relatively disadvantaged and less fertile areas - the homelands - these results
are likely to provide a lower bound for the positive effects of land access on household
welfare.
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Conclusion
This thesis has provided an analysis of household livelihoods in rural South Africa. The fo-
cus of the first two chapters is on how liquidity constraints and labour market imperfections
affect households’ allocation and use of resources. The first chapter explains household
labour allocation decisions using a theoretical farm household model developed from that
in Sadoulet et al. (1998). The model incorporates a liquidity constraint and transaction
costs in the labour market to explain the emergence of three distinct household categories:
small-scale peasants, self cultivators and hiring-in households. The model is tested empir-
ically and labour allocation decisions are found to be influenced by liquidity constraints
and market imperfections such as transaction costs and limited access to information. The
second chapter analyses technical efficiency at household level considering off-farm activ-
ities as additional outputs of production. The empirical analysis reveals the presence of
large inefficiencies that can be reduced by accessing sources of liquidity such as pension
transfers and income diversification. Finally the third chapter explores the relationship
between land endowments and household welfare. Results show the positive effect of land
access on household welfare. Land size is also positively related to household welfare so
that an increase of 1 hectare is expected to lift the household into a higher decile of the
welfare distribution. In general, the results reported in this thesis suggest that households’
decisions and performances are affected by the presence of market imperfections that limit
the ability of the households to optimally allocate, use and accumulate resources. Improv-
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ing access to the credit, labour and land market can improve households’ allocative and
technical efficiency as well as their welfare. The analyses conducted in this thesis present
some limitations that, although discussed in the text, are here reiterated to restate the
motivations that have led to particular methodological choices despite their shortcomings
and, in particular, to provide some suggestions and indications for future research.
In the first chapter, the potential endogeneity of some explanatory variables, in partic-
ular household composition and land endowments, has not been fully addressed because
of the lack of suitable instruments and of the particular estimation approach adopted: a
generalised ordered logit that does not easily handle endogeneity issues. This particular
methodology has been chosen for its adaptability to the specific theoretical propositions
under analysis. This method allows, in fact, the modelling of household-specific exposure
to market imperfections, relaxing the assumption of homogenous shadow wages that has
usually been adopted in the literature. This choice was taken at the expense of a less
conventional approach that cannot be easily adjusted to handle endogeneity problems,
therefore leaving room for further investigations.
In the second chapter, the use of a non-parametric technique (DEA) for the estimation
of household technical efficiency might raise some concerns about its deterministic nature
and its sensitivity to sample variation. There is an ongoing debate on the advantages
and disadvantages of this method and its parametric counterpart, the stochastic frontier
approach, and the conclusions are mixed and contrasting. The decision in favour of a
non-parametric technique has been driven mainly by the characteristics of the situation
under analysis, namely a multi-output multi-input production process, and of the type of
data considered: input and output data with zero entries. Although beyond the scope of
the analysis conducted in the chapter, a comparison of the results from the parametric and
non-parametric approaches could be the object of future research. An additional concern
arises from the use of off-farm income as a covariate in the analysis of technical efficiency,
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although not directly but as a component of the income diversification indicator. Its omis-
sion from the analysis could have led to biased estimates since labour allocation decisions
are likely to be correlated with pension receipt and household composition. Moreover the
lack of detailed information on household time allocation has prevented the use of a less
problematic indicator of income diversification. The problem was partially addressed using
instrumental variable techniques whose validity is, however, vulnerable to the potential
presence of serial correlation. This problem could be further investigated using alternative
surveys with more detailed information on household time allocation or other community
level information to be used as instruments for the income diversification indicator.
In the last chapter, the major concern arises from the use of the year of arrival as an
instrument for land access and size. It is argued that the year of arrival is exogenous since,
according to extensive narrative evidence, the timing of forced removals cannot be asso-
ciated with household-specific unobserved characteristics, yet not all movements recorded
by the surveys might be the result of forced removals. Because the reasons for moving
are unknown, one of the main concerns is that forced removals could be confounded with
voluntary migration challenging the exogeneity of the instrument. Voluntary relocations
were more likely to occur within the homelands since conditions in these areas were ex-
tremely unfavourable and the available descriptive evidence suggests that no household
would voluntarily move to the overcrowded and unpleasant homelands. In the chapter,
the problem is partially addressed by limiting the analysis to those households that moved
from non-homeland areas given the lower probability of encountering voluntary migration
in this subsample. Nevertheless, the lack of information prevented me from fully address-
ing this problem and calls for a more detailed record of information on household migration
history. A second concern arises from the assumption of a linear relationship between land
size and household welfare, which fails to capture the potentially non-linear effects of land
endowments. Non-linear analyses, however, often require non-parametric techniques or
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non-linear specifications where the presence of potential endogenous explanatory variables
require the use of less conventional and more complex solutions, when possible. Neverthe-
less the relevance of such heterogenous effects leaves room for further investigation of the
relationship between land and welfare across different dimensions of the farm household.
Finally, the three essays base their theoretical framework on a standard static farm
household model where the household is assumed to act as a unitary decision unit and the
process by which resources are distributed within the household is not taken into consid-
eration. Inter-temporal modelling is needed to introduce uncertainty and to model house-
holds’ behaviour toward risk. Although uncertainty and risk-aversion are likely to play an
important role in shaping households’ behaviours, these aspects have not been consider to
avoid making the analysis of market imperfections overly complex. However, because the
analysis of households’ risk-management and risk copying strategies can add important
insights into the analysis of rural households’ livelihoods (Dercon, 2002), it leaves room
for future research. As far as the unitary modelling of the household is concerned, the
theoretical and empirical analyses proposed in this thesis do not sufficiently explore intra-
household resource allocation and distribution. Although, for example, pension receipts
might have different effects according to the gender of the recipient (as shown in Duflo
(2003)), this distinction could not be made given the small size of the subsample of male
pensioners. Collective household models have been increasingly adopted in the literature
as an alternative to unitary models. These models explicitly consider the individuality
of the household members and only assume that intra-household decisions are Pareto
efficient (Chiappori, 1992). Empirical analyses conduced on the basis of the collective
modelling of the household are, however, more demanding in terms of data disaggregation
and often require specific surveys intended to capture intra-household task allocation and
bargaining relationships. Having such data, it would be interesting to analyse whether, for
example, household members are equally affected by liquidity constraints or whether the
114
distribution of tasks within the household matters for household efficiency and welfare.
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Appendix 1
The on-farm marginal productivity of labour, w∗, in the case of labour-autarkic house-
holds is used as latent decision variable in the empirical section of chapter 1. To analyse
how household characteristics and exogenous factors affect household membership in the
three categories, it is useful to analyse the response of the on-farm marginal productiv-
ity of labour to changes in its exogenous determinants. Considering the self-cultivators
category presented in the chapter, the following six equations are sufficient to determine
f1i , w
∗, x, y, p˜x and λ:
u1 = uypqL,
pqL = w∗,
pqx = px(1 + λα/uy),
y = pq(A, f1q , x)− pxx+ w2okf2 + T −K,
αw2okf
2 + ϕT − αpxx = 0,
uypqx − pxuy − αpxλ = 0.
Following Singh et al. (1986) we totally differentiate the first order conditions arranging
the results into a matrix framework:
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Recalling Cramer’s rule, the marginal effect of the k-th exogenous variables, zk, on the
on-farm marginal productivity of labour can be determined as follow:
∂w∗
∂zk
=
1
D
Dwk.
where D is the determinant of the first matrix (left hand side) reported above and it is
given by:
D = px(−u11 + 2u1ypqL − uyypqLpqL − uypqLL) > 0,
where Dwk is the determinant of the matrix obtained substituting the k-th column of the
last matrix into the third column of the first matrix. It is now possible to derive the sign
of the derivatives with respects to the exogenous variables of the model:
∂w∗
∂f1
=
1
D
[pqLLpxα(uy1pqL − u11)] < 0,
∂w∗
∂f2
=
1
D
[αw2ok(2u1ypqLpqLx − u11pqLx − u1ypqxpqLL + uyypqLpqLLpqx)
+pqLpqLLpxαuy2(1− k)] ≶ 0,
∂w∗
∂T
=
1
D
[(pqx + pxα(1− ϕ))(uyypqLpqLL − u1ypqLL)− pqLxpqLϕ(uyypqL − 2uy1)
−u11pqLxϕ] > 0,
∂w∗
∂px
=
1
D
[(pqLpqLx − pqLLpqx)(uyypqLx − uy1αx)− 2uy1pqLpqLxαx
+u11pqLxαx] < 0,
∂w∗
∂A
=
1
D
pxα[pqApqLL(uyy − uy1)− u11pqA + pqLpqLA(2uu1 − uyypqL)] > 0.
The ambiguity of the skilled labour endowment effect is now discussed. Considering
the extreme instance in which all skilled members are unemployed (k = 0), the above men-
tioned effect becomes unambiguously negative. In this case the self-cultivators model falls
into the classical Chayanov farm household model (Ellis, 1993) where the ratio between
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consumers and working members ((f1 + f2)/f1) is negative correlated with w∗, such that
a larger number of dependant skilled members lowers the marginal productivity of labour.
However, when k > 0, the higher the amount of time skilled members devote to off-farm
labour the lower is their dependance on the rest of the household and, at the same time, the
higher are the positive income and liquidity effects induced by the extra off-farm earnings.
These two opposite effects (the consumers-workers ratio effect and the income/liquidity
effect) explain the ambiguity of the overall sign.
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Appendix 2
Table 9: First stage regressions
Pensioner Share off
(dummy) farm income
Eligible man (dummy) 0.324*** Share off farm income in 1998 0.288***
(0.070) (0.064)
Eligible woman (dummy) 0.644*** Household eligibility -1.051
(0.057) (6.881)
Share off farm income -0.0006
(0.000)
Gender of household head -0.047 Gender of household head 7.405
(0.029) (6.841)
Age of household head 0.015*** Age of household head -0.034
(0.002) (0.295)
Education of household head -0.004 Education of household head -0.582
(0.003) (0.671)
Ratio of skilled members 0.051 Ratio of skilled members 11.220
(0.058) (12.290)
Title on land -0.018 Title on land -4.769
(0.023) (4.789)
Employment rate (district) 0.00131 Employment rate (district) 0.126
(0.001) (0.207)
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 88.574 Kleibergen-Paap F stat 14.882
Observations 505 N 193
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Regressions include all the covariates used in the
second stage analysis previously reported.
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Appendix 3
Table 10: First stage regressions
(1) (2)
Land (dummy) Land (hectares)
Year of arrival -0.009*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.003)
Education of household head -0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.003)
Age of household head -0.002 0.030
(0.010) (0.036)
Gender of household head (dummy) 0.014 0.556***
(0.045) (0.155)
Pension eligible members (dummy) -0.120 0.054
(0.081) (0.190)
Children age 1-5 0.060* -0.085
(0.035) (0.064)
Children age 6-17 0.048*** -0.039
(0.015) (0.036)
Number of skilled members 0.063*** 0.019
(0.021) (0.064)
Number of unskilled members 0.064*** -0.051
(0.017) (0.046)
Highest level of education 0.003 0.051
(0.003) (0.048)
Labor market dev index (district level) -0.257** -1.440***
(0.111) (0.004)
Population density (district level) -0.000*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.001)
Observations 695 2736
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All regressions include also the square of the age of the head of the household.
